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L Introduction
The recent explosive growth of the Internet as a vehicle for commerce
and expression of ideas has brought with it an explosion of trademark litiga-
tion. Trademark law traditionally has been an area where the most prominent
features are "doctrinal confusion, conflicting results, and judicial prolixity,"1
and this is even more true in the area of Interet trademark law. As the United
States Senate noted when it recently enacted a bill to help bring some cer-
tainty to this murky area, "uncertainty as to the trademark law's application
to the Interet has produced inconsistent judicial decisions and created exten-
sive monitoring obligations, unnecessary legal costs, and uncertainty for con-
sumers and trademark owners alike."2
Applying trademark law to the Internet presents difficulty because
trademark infiingement traditionally has required a likelihood of confusion
among consumers to be actionable, and courts have had difficulty fitting the
special nature of Internet confusion into this framework. Many courts have
lost sight of the fact that trademark law traditionally has required reasonable-
ness on the part of consumers' and have expanded the likelihood of confusion
in Internet cases to protect consumers who are "gullible, careless, and easily
deceived."4 Courts have done this by stretching traditional trademark con-
cepts to make actionable the initial confusion of Internet users who arrive at
a site other than the one they are searching for. This form of confusion is
1. HMH Publ'g Co. v. Brineat, 504 F.2d 713,716(9th Cir. 1974).
2. S.REP.NO. 106-140,at7(1999).
3. See HQM, Ltd. v. Hatfield, 71 F. Supp. 2d 500,508-09 (D. Md. 1999) (pointing out
that trademark law has always required reasonableness on part of consumers and that mere
inconvenience is not actionable) (citing Hasbro v. Clue Computing, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 2d 117,
124-25 (D. Mass. 1999)).
4. See Jessica Litman, Breakfast with Barman: The Public Interest in the Advertising
Age, 108 YALE L.J. 1717, 1722 (1999) (criticizing paternalistic judicial attitudes which assume
consumers are "extraordinarily gullible").
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known as "initial interest confusion" because of the possibility that potential
customers, looking for the web site of company A, will be diverted to the web
site of company B and decide to use the offerings of company B's infringing
site instead.5 Since a major Ninth Circuit decision in April 1999 explicitly
applied initial interest confusion in the Internet context for the first time,
6
courts have employed this doctrine with alarming regularity.' Some of these
courts have stretched the doctrine to the point where it no longer serves the
basic goals of trademark law.!
Part 11 of this Note provides a brief introduction to the Internet, particu-
larly the mechanics of search engines and metatags.9 Part nm discusses the dual
goals of trademark law and the federal cause of action for trademark infringe-
ment.1° Part III also outlines the development of the initial interest confusion
doctrine and its sporadic use before the appearance of the Internet." Part IV
examines how the initial interest confusion doctrine has been applied in Inter-
net trademark infringement actions with increasing frequency in the past two
years.12 This section discusses application ofthe doctrine to two distinct types
of infringement claims: metatagging and domain names.'3 Part V discusses
some ofthe problems with application ofthe initial interest confusion doctrine
on the Internet and the troubling implications it raises for technological innova-
tion and First Amendment rights.' 4 Part VI proposes a framework for courts
analyzing claims of trademark infringement on the Internet based on initial
interest confusion."
This Note concludes thatthe increasing frequency with which courts have
been willing to find a likelihood of confusion (and therefore trademark in-
5. See infra Part IV (describing initial interest confusion in context of Internet).
6. See infra Part IV.A.I (discussing Ninth Circuit's decision in Brookfield Communica-
tions).
7. See infra Part IV (tracing application of initial interest confusion to Internet trademark
disputes).
8. See infra Part V.A (explaining why initial interest confusion does not serve goals of
trademark law).
9. See infra Part II (providing background information on Internet).
10. See infra Part Ill (providing background information on trademark law).
11. See infra Part ll (discussing development of initial interest confusion before Internet
cases).
12. See infra Part IV (examining application of initial interest confusion doctrine to Inter-
net trademark disputes).
13. See infra PartIV (discussing cases applying initial interest confusion in ntemetcontext).
14. See infra Part V (examining implications of overly broad application of initial interest
confusion doctrine).
15. See infra Part VI (discussing when courts should find trademark infringement based
on initial interest confusion).
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fringement) based solely on initial interest confusion has potentially troubling
consequences for the continued growth and maturation of the Internet. The
Note suggests that initial interest confusion should be a basis for a finding of
trademark infringement only when this confusion is likely to cause competitive
damage.16 The Note also suggests that the recently enacted federal trademark
dilution and anticybersquatting statutes provide a better framework for analyz-
ing many claims that courts have attempted to shoehorn into the traditional
infringement framework."
f. The Internet
A. The Web and Domain Names
The Internet is a global network connecting millions of individual com-
puters and computer networks.'i Information on the Internet is stored in web
pages, which are files stored on a computer that may be viewed by any other
computer on the Internet. 9 Web pages may contain text, pictures, sound, and
links to other web pages.2" Web pages are viewed using a "browser" software
program such as Netscape Navigator or Microsoft Internet Explorer.2 A web
site is a collection of web pages with a common theme or topic.'
Web sites are identified by numeric Internet Protocol (IP) addresses such
as "129.114.46.127," and each IP address has a corresponding domain name,
which is an alphanumeric address such as "wwwmicrosoft.com" or "www.
wlu.edu."iM Every domain name has a secondary-level domain (SLD) such as
"microsoft" or "wlu" and a top-level domain (TLD) such as ".com," ".org,"
".edu," ".net," ".gov," " mil," or one of a number of international TLDs.24 The
".com" domain is the most popular and easier to obtain than some others that
16. See infta Part VII (suggesting that courts should apply initial interest confusion doc-
trine only in situations where confusion is likely to cause competitive damage).
17. See infra Part VI (suggesting courts should apply trademark dilution and anticyber-
squatting remedies where possible).
18. See Playboy Enters. v. Welles, 78 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1091 (SD. Cal. 1999) (defining
Internet).
19. See Sporty's Farm v. Sportsman's Mkt., 202 F3d 489,492 (2d Cir. 2000) (providing
brief explanation ofInternet), cert denied, 120 S. Ct 2719 (2000).
20. See id. (explaining contents of web pages).
21. See Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. W. CoastEntm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036,1044
(9th Cir. 1999) (explaining how browser software allows Internet user to view web pages).
22. See Welles, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 1091 (defining web sites).
23. See Jennifer Golinveaux, What'sIn aDomain Name: Is "Cybersquatting" Trademark
Dilution?, 33 U.S.F. L. REV. 641, 642 (1999) (explaining anatomy of domain name system).
24. Id.
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theoretically are reserved for certain types of organizations.' In the past, a
single domain name registrar, Network Solutions, Inc. (NSI), assigned domain
names; however, the registration process recently has been opened up to
competition from other companies, under the supervision ofthe Internet Com-
mittee for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) 6
B. Search Engines and Metatags
Search engines provide a means of accessing the vast array of information
on the Internet There are two basic types of search engines: Human-com-
piled directory search engines such as Yahoo and LookSmart and web-crawler
engines such as Excite, AltaVista, and Northern Light? Human-organized
search engines are directories compiled and organized by human editors."
Web-crawler engines use programs known as "spiders"3 to search and catalog
pages on the web." Although there are several offshoot and hybrid forms of
search engines,3" these are the two main types.3
The typical web-crawler search engine uses a program that reads and
catalogs the Hyper Text Mark-Up Language (HTML) source code of individ-
ual web pages.34 This includes not only the visible text of a web page, but
also the page's metatags, which are words embedded in the code of a web
25. Id. For example, ".gov" is reserved for governmental entities, and ".edu" is reserved
for educational institutions. Id. The ".net" and ".org" TLDs are, in theory, reserved for com-
puter networks and nonprofit organizations, respectively, but are freely available because appli-
cations for domains with these TLDs are not screened. Id.
26. See Rajiv Chandrasekaran,AOL, Four Other Firms toAssign NetAddresses, WAsHL
PosT, Apr. 22, 1999, at E01 (discussing expansion of domain name registration business).
Ninety-eight companies are now approved to register domain names. Leslie WalkerAddressng
the Name Questfon, WAsH. POST, Dec. 23,1999, at E01.
27. See Playboy Enters. v. Welles, 78 F. Supp. 2d 1066,1091 (S.D. Cal. 1999) (discuss-
ing search engines).
28. Id.
29. I (describing human directory search engines).
30. See Maureen A. O'RourkeDefiingtheLimitsofFree-Ridingin Cyberspace: Trade-
markLiabililyfor Metatagging, 33 GONZ. L. Ruv. 277,283 (1997/98) (discussing mechanics
ofweb-crawler search engines).
31. See Welles, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 1092 (defining web-crawler search engines).
32. See Elizabeth Weise, Successfil Net Search Starts with Need, USA TODAY, Jan. 24,
2000, at 3D (mentioning search engines such as Google, which ranks query results according
to popularity, and Ask Jeeves, which allows for natural-language queries).
33. Id. This Note will use the term "search engine" to refer only to the web-crawler type
of search engine.
34. See Playboy Enters. v. Welles, 78 F. Supp. 2d 1066,1092 (S.D. Cal. 1999) (explain-
ing mechanics of search engines).
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page that are not visible to a user looking at the web page. 5 When a query is
entered into a search engine, the search engine ranks query results based on
formulas and algorithms that take into account such factors as the title of the
page, the number of times the searched-for word appears on the page, the
number of times the searched-for word appears in the metatags of the page,
and the location of the searched-for word on the page. 6
Searches often yield thousands of results because of the vast amount of
information available on the Intemet.' However, only the results at the very
top of a result list are likely to be clicked on, and most users are unlikely to
sift through more than a few pages of query results to find what they are look-
ing for.38
There is intense, often brutal competition among web page authors to have
their sites listed in search engines. 9 The primary reason for this competition
is that the amount web site owners can charge advertisers to advertise on their
sites is directly dependent on how many "hits" the web site receives.' There-
fore, web page owners have a substantial interest in diverting traffic to their
sites by any means possible.4' Additionally, it is preferable for a page to be
listed as highly as possible in a list of query results because many search engine
users only look atthe first few results of a particular search.42 An entire cottage
industry has sprung up around devising methods for web page authors to
increase traffic from search engines and receive favorable placement in search
engine results.
43
35. See id. (defining metatags).
36. Id. The algorithms used vary among search engines. Id.
37. See, e.g., Sporty's Farm v. Sportsman's Mkt, 202 F.3d 489, 493 (2d Cir. 2000)
("Given the current state of search engine technology, [a] search will often produce a list of
hundreds of web sites through which the user must sort in order to find what he or she is
looking for.'), cert denied, 120 S. Ct 2719 (2000); Panavision Int'l v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d
1316, 1327 (9th Cir. 1999) ("Use of a 'search engine' can turn up hundreds of web sites.");
SNA, Inc. v. Array, 51 F. Supp. 2d 542, 552 n.9 (E.D. Pa. 1999) ("[S]earches often yield
thousands of possible Web sites.").
38. See Scott Shipman, Comment, Trademark and Unfair Competition in Cyberspace:
Can These Laws Deter "Baiting" Practices on Web Sites?, 39 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 245,276
(1998) (explaining that many consumers only look at first couple of hits on search engine results
page).
39. See Ira S. NathensonInternetlnfoglutandlnvisiblelnk. SpamdexingSearchEngines
with Meta Tags, 12 HARv. JL. & TECEL 43, 58 (1998) (explaining competition for "any com-
pelitive advantage").
40. See id. at 61 (describing economic incentive to attract hits from search engines).
41. See F. Gregory LastowkaSearch Engines, HTML, and Trademarks: What'sthe Meta
For?, 86 VA. L. RaV. 835, 851 (2000) ("[B]usinesses on the web are engaged in a pitched battle
to attract Web users to their sites.").
42. See Shipman, supra note 38, at 276 (stating most search engine users only read first
page of results).
43. See Lastowka, supra note 41, at 851 (noting that "[n]umerous Web sites are devoted
1308
THE INITL4L INTEREST CONFUSION DOCTRINE
Trademarkproblems often arise fromthis competition for favorable place-
ment in search engine results because many of the most frequently searched
terms are company and product names qualifying for trademark protection.44
Celebrity names, which receive protection similar to trademarks under the
"right of publicity" doctrine,45 also are among the most frequently searched
terms.
46
The primary means of improving search engine placement is through the
strategic use of metatags and buried textM Metatags are words embedded in
the code of a web page that are not visible to a user viewing the page, but
which a search engine can pick up when reading the page.' The metatags of
a particular web page are only visible through an examination of the source
code for the page.49 There are two basic types of metatags: descriptor meta-
tags and keyword metatags. ° Descriptor metatags allow a web page's author
to insert a brief description of the web page that will appear in search engine
entirely to offering the best methods for improving search engine rankings"); Nathenson, supra
note 39, at 61 (discussing search engine placement industry).
44. See Uncensored WordsListathttp/www.searchwords.com/toplO0w.htm (lastvisited
Nov. 10, 2000) (listing "hotmail," "yahoo," "pokemon," "playboy," "victorias secret," 'wwf," and
"american airlines" among fifty terms most frequently queried in search engines).
45. See 4 J. THomAS MCCAR Y,MCCRTHY ONTRAD ANDUNFARCOo .TEI-
TION § 28:1 (4th ed. 1998) (defining right of publicity as person's right to control commercial
use of his or her identity). While there have not yet been any reported cases surrounding the
right of publicity on the nteret, such litigation is inevitable as web page authors attempt to use
celebrity names to draw traffic to their pages. These claims are likely to have considerable
success given that the common law right of publicity standard does not require a showing of
likelihood of confusion. See Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, 698 F.2d 831, 834-37
(6th Cir. 1983) (finding that although plaintiff had not shown trademark infringement because
there was no likelihood of confusion, defendant's use of "Her's Johnny!" phrase commonly
associated with plaintiff was intentional appropriation of plaintiff's identity for commercial
exploitation, thus invading plaintiff's right of publicity).
46. See UncesoredWordsLisathttp//www.searchwords.com/toplOOw.htmastvisited
Nov. 10, 2000) (listing "pamela anderson," "jennifer love hewitt,' "britaey spears," and "jenna
jameson" among fifty terms most frequently queried in search engines).
47. 4 MCCART1Y, supra note 45, § 25.69. Although the term "buried text' is sometimes
used to refer to metatags, "buried text" actually refers to a more primitive practice of including
words in the body of a web page that are the same color of the background (e.g. white-on-white
or black-on-black) so that the words will be invisible to a viewer but will be picked up by search
engines. Id. § 25.69, at n.6.
48. See Playboy Enters. v. Welles, 78 F. Supp. 2d 1066,1092 (S.D. Cal. 1999) (discuss-
ing metatags).
49. See Michael R. Sees, Note, Use ofAnother's Trademark in a Web Page Meta Tag:
Why Liability Should Not Ensue Under the Lanham Act for Trademark Infringement, 5 TEX.
WEsLEYANL. REV. 99,110 n.87 (1998) (explainingthat source code ofweb page can be viewed
through use of"View Source" function on Internet browser while page is displayed).
50. See Welles, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 1092 (describing two primary types of metatags).
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query results." Keyword metatags allow page authors to include a list of
"keywords" relevant to the page and its contents so that a search engine will
be able to easily index the page. 2 In that regard, keyword metatags can be
compared to the subject index of a card catalog. 3
Although metatags were created as aids to the indexing of web pages, in
reality they are often used to artificially boost a page's ranking in search engine
query results.54 There are two ways that metatags can be used to manipulate
the results of search engine queries; the first method involves "stuffing" the
meta tag lines with popular search terms completely unrelated to the content
ofthepage. 5 The second method strategicallytargets web searchers inputting
certain terms into search engines.56 For example, a small bookstore might
include the term "Barnes & Noble" in its metatags in an effort to lure custom-
ers who are searching for the official web site of the Barnes and Noble book-
store chain.57 This second form of manipulative metatagging is where most
of the current case law on metatags has developed.58
I. Trademark and Unfair Competition Law
A. The Dual Goals of TrademarkLaw
Trademark law is one aspect of the law of unfair competition. 9 There
are two main goals of trademark law.' The primary goal is the protection of
the reasonable expectations of consumers and the prevention of consumer
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. See Playboy Enters. v. Welles, 78 F. Supp. 2d 1098,1104 (S.D. Cal. 1998) (compar-
ing metatags to subject index of card catalog and stating they provide "a clearer indication of
the content ofawebsite").
54. See Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. W. CoastEntm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036,1045
(9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that "[tlhe more often a term appears in the metatags and in the text
of the web page, the more likely it is that the web page will be 'hit' in a search for that keyword
and the higher on the list of 'hits' the web page will appear").
55. See Barbara Anna McCoy, Comment An Invisible Mark. AMeta-Tag Controversy,
2 . SMALL & EMERMGING BUS. L. 377,379 (1998) ("Simply including frequently searched. terms
within the meta-tag can increase a site's audience, even though the site itself may have nothing
to do with the searched terms.").
56. Id. at 383.
57. See id. (explaining how small business could include names of larger and better-
known competitors and "piggyback" on searches for their official sites).
58. Id.
59. See I MCCARTHY, supra note 45, § 2:7 (mcluding trademark law within broader field
of unfair competition law).
60. See Avery Dennison Co. v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868, 873 (9th Cir. 1999) (discussing
dual goals of trademark law).
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confusion (the "consumer expectations" goal).' Trademark infringement
"deprives consumers of their ability to distinguish among the goods of con-
peting manufacturers."'62 The second goal of trademark law is the protection
of the investment that the mark's owner has made in the mark (the "propri-
etary interest" goal).6' Trademark owners spend billions of dollars each year
to distinguish their goods and services from those of their competitors, and
infringement oftrademarks deprives the owner ofthe goodwill which required
substantial investments of energy, time, and money to obtain.'
It is worth noting that while one goal (the "consumer expectations" goal)
is essentially public in nature, the other (the "proprietary interest" goal)
focuses on protecting private interests. 5 It is no coincidence that the courts
must often balance these two conflicting goals. ' Additionally, courts must
balance these two goals against the desire to encourage free competition.6' In
recent years, legal commentators have criticized the legislatures and the courts
for paying too much attention to the private interests embodied in trademarks
at the expense of open competition and the public interest. '
B. Trademark Infingement
The federal cause of action for trademark infringement is codified in the
Federal Trademark Act of 1946, commonly known as the Lanham Act.69
Under Section 32(a) of the Act, a party may be liable for trademark infringe-
ment when it "use[s] in commerce any... copy, or colorable imitation of a
registered mark in connection with the sale.., or advertising of any goods or
services ... [when] such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake,
61. See l MCCARTHaY, supra note 45, § 2:33 (describing primary goal of trademark law).
62. Inwood Labs. v. Ives Labs., 456 U.S. 844,855 n.14 (1982).
63. See Avery Dennison, 189 F.3d at 873 (discussing proprietary interest goal of trade-
mark law).
64. See InwoodLabs., 456 U.S. at 854 n.14 (discussing dual goals oftrademark law).
65. See generaly Litman, supra note 4 (explaining competing public and private interests
in trademark law).
66. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 45, § 2.1 (stating that "[t]he law of unfair competition
has traditionally been a battleground for competing policies").
67. Id.
68. See generalyAlexKozinski, Trademarks Unplugged, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 960 (1993)
(discussing changing role of trademarks from source identifiers to products themselves); Mark
A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE L.J. 1687
(1999) (criticizing trends toward granting of trademark rights in gross); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr.,
TrademarkMonopolies, 48 EMORY L.J. 367 (1999) (criticizing expansion of trademark law for
granting monopoly rights in trademarks).
69. Federal TrademarkAet of 1946,15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1999).
1311
57 WASH. &LEE L. REV 1303 (2000)
or to deceive."7 The keystone of trademark infringement is the likelihood of
confusion." Courts must determine whether consumers are likely to be con-
fused about the source, sponsorship, or affiliation of the allegedly infringing
products or services. 2
Courts use multi-factor tests to determine whether there is a likelihood
of confusion in a particular case. 3 While the tests vary among courts, the
most frequently cited is the Second Circuit's Polaroid test which considers
eight factors: the strength of the mark, the similarity of the marks, the com-
petitive proximity of the products offered, the likelihood that the senior users
will '"bridge the gap" between the products, evidence of actual confusion, the
intent of the junior user in adopting the mark, the quality of the junior user's
product, and the sophistication of the buyers.74 Regardless of the test used,
determining whether confusion is likely is almost always a fact-specific query
that has no bright-line answers. 5
Most litigation regarding Internet trademark infringement has surrounded
disputes over domain names.7' During the early years of the growth of popu-
larity of the web, NSI maintained a first-come, first-serve policy to the regis-
tration of domain names.77 As a result, many entrepreneurial individuals reg-
istered the names of famous companies and trademarks as domains in the
hopes of selling them back to the trademark owners.' This practice became
known as "eybersquatting."79 Other disputes arose when companies registered
the domain names corresponding to the trademarks of competitors." Still
others arose when two companies had concurrent rights to a trademark but
70. Id. § 1114(lXa)(1999).
71. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 45, § 2.8 (describing likelihood of confusion as key-
stone of trademark infringement).
72. See 3 McCARTnY, supra note 45, § 23:1 (explaining likelihood of confusion test).
73. See DONAiD S. CBisum & MICHAEL A. JACOBS, UNDERSTANWING NILCrUAL
PROPERTY LAW § SF(lXaXi) (1992) (comparing and contrasting likelihood of confusion
tests).
74. See Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492,495 (2d Cir. 1961) (setting
forth eight-factor likelihood of confusion test).
75. See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 45, § 23:1 (discussing likelihood of confusion).
76. See generally Danielle Weinberg Swartz, Comment, The Limitations of Trademark
Law in Addressing Domain Name Disputes, 45 UCLAL. REv. 1487 (1998) (tracing history of
domain name litigation).
77. See Panavision Int'l v. Tooppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1319 (9th Cir. 1999) (mentioning
NSI policies on domain name registration).
78. See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 45, § 25:77 (discussing cybersquatting).
79. Id.
80. See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 45, § 25:76 (discussing other forms of domain name
disputes).
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only one could have a corresponding domain name."' Courts have used a
variety of theories, including both trademark infringement and dilution, to
analyze domain name disputes, but there has been a clear trend towards a
finding of liability and transfer of the domain name to the trademark owner.'
C. The Origins and Development oflnitial Interest Confusion
The scope of confusion actionable under the Lanham Act has been ex-
panded greatly since 1946.83 The statute used to contain a qualification that
the junior user's use of a mark must be "likely to cause confusion or mistake
or to deceive purchasers" as to the source of the goods or services at issue.
84
A 1962 amendment to the act removed the "purchasers" limitation, so that the
relevant language became "likely to cause confusion or mistake or to de-
ceive."85 Perhaps because of the ambiguous legislative history surrounding
this amendment, courts were slow to move away from the traditional view that
the only relevant confusion is that at the point of sale. However, a substan-
tial number of courts now are willing to find infringement when there is con-
fusion that creates initial interest on the part ofpotential customers, even ifthe
confusion is dispelled by the time of the sale or there is no actual sale.' This
is known as the theory of "pre-sale" or "initial interest" confusion.88
The initial interest confusion doctrine serves primarily to prevent a
company from gaining an unfair competitive advantage through its use of a
competitor's trademark.89 This rationale is sometimes phrased as prevent-
ing a company from "getting a foot in the door"' at the expense of a competi-
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. See Litman, supra note 4, at 1722 (explaining that trademark law now protects against
after-market confusion, reverse confusion, subliminal confusion, confusion about possibility of
sponsorship or acquiescence, and confusion about what sorts of confusion are actionable).
84. See Michael 3. Allen, The Scope of Confusion Actionable Under Federal Trademark
Law: Who Must Be Confused and When?, 26 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 321,330 (1991) (tracing
history of statutory language of Lanham Act).
85. Act of Oct. 9,1962, Pub. L. No. 87-772, § 17,76 Stat. 773.
86. See Allen, supra note 84, at 331-32 (discussing continued judicial focus on purchaser
confusion).
87. See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 45, § 23:6 (discussing initial interest confusion).
88. Id. The type of confusion discussed in this Note will be referred to as "initial interest"
confusion because most recent cases of note have used this term, even though many earlier cases
refer to "pre-sale" confusion.
89. See 3 McCARTHY, supra note 45, § 23:6 (discussing initial interest confusion).
90. See Foxworthy v. Custom Tees, 879 F. Supp. 1200,1216 (ND. Ga. 1995) (findingthat
defendant's unauthorized use of plaintiff's "you might be a redneck if..." catch phrase on t-
shirts constituted trademark infringement because phrase might attract potential customers).
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tor.91 This "foot in the door" confusion "indicates not only an unfair conipeti-
tive advantage but the actual embodiment of confusion."'
Thomas McCarthy, author of the leading treatise on trademark law, has
drawn an analogy between companies which capitalize on initial interest
confusion and job applicants who intentionally inflate their educational or
employment background on a resume.' Even ifthe truth about the applicant's
background is revealed before the applicant receives ajob offer, "[t]he misrep-
resentation has enabled the job-seeker to obtain a coveted interview, a clear
advantage over others with the same background who honestly stated their
educational achievements on their resumes. In such a situation, it is not
possible to say that the misrepresentation caused no competitive damage. tM
Courts applying initial interest confusion have focused on the infringing
company's misappropriation of the reputation and goodwill built up in another
company's trademarks. This was the rationale behind Grotrian, Helfferich,
Schulz, Th. Steinweg Nachf v. Steinway & Sons,9' a decision which barred the
plaintiff from using the "Grotrian-Steinweg" mark on its pianos as it was con-
fusingly similar to the defendant's "Steinway" mark.96 As the court explained:
Mhe harm to Steinway... is the likelihood that a consumer, hearing the
"Grotrian-Steinweg" name and thinking it had some connection with
"Steinway," would consider it on that basis. The "Grotrian-Steinweg"
name therefore would attract potential customers based on the reputation
built up by Steinway in this country for many years.
97
91. See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 45, § 23:6 (describing purpose of initial interest
confusion doctrine).
92. Foxworthy, 879 F. Supp. at 1216; see also Elvis Presley Enters. v. Capece, 141 F.3d
188, 204 (5th Cir. 1998) (observing that "[i]nitial interest confusion gives the junior user
credibility during the early stages of a transaction and can possibly bar the senior user from
consideration by the consumer once the confusion is dissipated").
93. 3 McCARTHY, supra note 45, § 23:6.
94. Id.
95. 523 F.2d 1331 (2d Cir. 1975).
96. See Grotrian, Heliferich, Schulz, Th. Steinweg Nachf. v. Steinway & Sons, 523 F.2d
1331, 1342 (2d Cir. 1975) (finding pre-sale confusion actionable). In Steinway & Sons, the
plaintiff, a German piano manufacturer, sought a declaratory judgment that the use of "Grotrian-
Steinweg" as a trade name did not infringe the defendant's "Steinway" trademark. Id. at 1335.
Despite survey evidence and a few instances of actual confusion, the court found it unlikely that
consumers would buy plaintiff's pianos thinking that they were in fact Steinway pianos. Id. at
1342. The court instead found potential harm to Steinway in that potential consumers might
hear the "Steinweg" name, associate it with "Steinway," and thus develop an interest in the
plaintiffls pianos that they would not have had otherwise. Id. The court rejected the plaintiff's
argument that the defendant was required to demonstrate actual or potential confusion "at the
time of purchase." Id.
97. Id. at 1342.
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Before the emergence of the unique problems of-trademarks on the Inter-
net, the theory of initial interest confusion was used sporadically." The doc-
trine's origins usually are traced to the Steinway & Sons decision in 1973,'
but the theory did not begin to gain widespread acceptance until the Second
Circuit's 1987 decision in Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp., c°
wiich upheld an injunction barring an oil company from using a mark similar
to Mobil's "Pegasus" symbol." SinceMobil Oil, the Fifth," Seventh,lra and
Ninth Circuits' have recognized initial interest confusion. A number of
district courts have also recognized the doctrine.
05
However, not all courts that have considered the issue have held that
initial interest confusion is actionable under the Lanham Act °6 The First Cir-
98. SeeAllensupra note 84, at339-44 (tracing hitoryofinitialinterestconfusiondoctrine).
99. Id.
100. 818 F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1987).
101. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d 254, 260 (2d Cir. 1987)
(affirming district court's finding of likely trademark infringement). In Mobil Oil, Pegasus
Petroleum, an oil trading company which did not sell to the general public, used the "Pegasus"
name to advertise its products. Id. at 255-56. The plaintiff, which had a "Pegasus" logo with
a high degree of consumer recognition, objected to the defendant's use of the "Pegasus" name
and symbol. Id. at 256. The court accepted Pegasus' argument that there was no actual con-
fusion in the sense that customers of Pegasus would not actually believe they were purchasing
from Mobil Oil. Id. at 259. However, the court stated that by using the confusingly similar
symbol, Pegasus could gain attention in the marketplace at Mobil's expense. Id. This could
lead to "crucial credibility" for Pegasus during the early phases of a deal. Id. According to the
court, this confusion "works a sufficient trademark injury." Id. at 260. Therefore, the court
affirmed the district court's finding of trademark infringement. Id.
102. See Elvis Presley Enters. v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188,204 (5th Cir. 1998) (stating that
trademark infringement can be based on confusion before sale).
103. See Dorr-Oliver, Inc. v. Fluid-Quip, Inc., 94 F.3d 376,382 (7thCir. 1996)(recogniz-
ing initial interest confusion and comparing it to 'bait and switch' techniques).
104. See Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books USA, 109 F.3d 1394, 1405 (9th Cir. 1997)
(recognizing potential application of initial interest confusion).
105. See, e.g., ScuraComm Consulting, Inc. v. SecuraCom, Inc., 984 F. Supp. 286,298-99
(D.N.J. 1997) (stating that initial interest confusion can be damaging even if customers are
sophisticated enough to recognize differences between products), rev'd on other grounds, 166
F.3d 182 (3d Cir. 1999); Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc. v. Manny's Porshop, Inc., 972 F. Supp.
1128,1131 (N.D. IlL 1997) ("[E]ven if sophisticated customers eventually discover that [defen-
dant's shop] is not related to plaintiffs, a trademark violation can exist simply from the initial
confusion."); Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 , Ltd., 942 F. Supp. 1513, 1552 (S.D. Tex. 1996)
("[T]he Lanham Act is violated whenever there is confusion inthe buying process... even if the
purchaser's confusion is later dispelled through use or familiarization with the product");
Jordache Enters. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 841 F. Supp. 506,514-15 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (recognizing
actionable confusion whoe potential consumers are attracted to junior users mark because of
similarity to senior users mark, even if confusion is dispelled by time ofpurchase).
106. See, e.g., Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. W. CoastEntm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036,
1063-64 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing differing views on initial interest confusion); Munsingwear, Inc.
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cuit, inAstra Pharmaceutical Products v. Beckman Instruments,"°7 acknowl-
edged that there might be "ternporary confusion" about whether Beckman's
"ASTRA" blood analyzers were associated with Astra Pharmaceutical Prod-
ucts, but declined to find infringement based upon this fleeting confusion.'
The court strongly suggested that only confusion surrounding "he ultimate
decision of a purchaser whether to buy a particular product" is actionable.
1 9
The Federal Circuit, which has jurisdiction over appeals from the Trademark
Trial and Appeal Board, also has refused to adopt the initial interest confusion
doctrine.' In Weiss Associates, Inc. v. HRL Associates, Inc.," the court
reviewed a Board decision denying registration of the mark "TMM" for
computer software because it was confusingly similar to the mark "TMS" that
was used by a competing company to market similar software."' The court
v. Jockey Int'l, Inc., Civ. 4-93-538, 1994 WL 422280, at *4 n.6 (D. Minn. April 21, 1994)
(noting split in circuits); Allen, supra note 84, at 342 (recognizing split between approaches of
Second Circuit and Federal Circuit).
107. 718 F.2d 1201 (1st Cir. 1983).
108. See Astra Pharm. Prods. v. Beckman Instruments, 718 F.2d 1201, 1207 (1st Cir.
1983) (finding no likelihood of confusion where confusion did not affect purchasing decision).
In Astra Pharmaceutical Products, Astra, a manufacturer of pharmaceutical preparations and
prefilled syringes, sought to enjoin Beckman from using the mark "ASTRA" on a computerized
blood analysis machine. Id. at 1203. The court analyzed Astra's claim under the eight-factor
test then used in the First Circuit. Id. at 1205-09. In finding no likelihood of confusion, the
court noted that there were substantial differences between the products at issue and that they
were marketed through different channels. Id. at 1205-06. However, the key factor for the court
was the sophistication of purchasers; the blood analyzer was expensive and was sold only to
highly sophisticated hospital chemistry labs, who were unlikely to be confused. Id. at 1206.
The court acknowledged that there may be brief confusion when a nurse or technician familiar
with the blood analyzer sees an Astra salesman, but found this confusion irrelevant because
nurses or technicians are not involved in the buying process and their temporary confusion
would therefore have no impact on any purchasing decisions. Id. at 1207.
109. Id. at 1207.
110. See Allen, supra note 84, at 342 (noting that Federal Circuit has "called into question
the validity ofthe pre-sale or initial confusion doctrine").
111. 902 F.2d 1546 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
112. See Weiss Assocs., Inc. v. HRLAssocs., Inc., 902 F..2d 1546, 1549 (Fed. Cir. 1990)
(declining to reach question of whether to adopt initial interest confusion doctrine). In Weiss
Associates, Weiss sought to register the trademark "TMM" for computer software. Id. at 1547.
HRL, which made similar software under the name "TMS," objected to the proposed regis-
tration. Id. The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board found that although the products of
both parties were purchased only by sophisticated buyers after deliberate consideration, there
was still a likelihood of initial interest confusion based upon the similarity of the marks. Id.
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, in reviewing the board's decision, found that
the products and marks were similar enough that there would be a likelihood of confusion
had Weiss been allowed to use the "TMM" mark. Id. at 1549. However, the Federal Cir-
cuit specifically noted that it did not "address or embrace" the theory of initial interest confu-
sion. Id.
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noted that the Board had based its decision in part upon the concept of initial
interest confusion.113 However, the court declined to uphold the reasoning of
the Board on this issue, stating that "this ourt... does not in this case ad-
dress or embrace the theory of initial confusion."" 4 The court instead upheld
the Board's decision based on the ground that there was a traditional likeli-
hood of confusion."' Several district courts have likewise refused to find a
likelihood of confusion based solely on initial interest confusion." 6
The theory of initial interest confusion is best suited to the second goal
oftrademark law, protecting the goodwill that companies have built up in their
trademarks." 7 Courts applying initial interest confusion in pre-Intemet cases
focused on this goal and did not base their findings on the "consumer expecta-
tions" rationale."' Through its focus on situations where a company was try-
ing to get its foot in the door of the market at the expense of an established
competitor, the initial interest confusion doctrine served as a tool for courts
to combat unfair competition in limited situations. In fact; almost all of the
initial interest confusion cases in the pre-Internet era involved disputes
between companies offering very similar goods or services," 9 or companies
113. Id. at 1549.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. See Inc. Publ'g Corp. v. Manhattan Magazine, Inc., 616 F. Supp. 370,387 (SD.N.Y.
1985) ("[C]onfusion of the 'foot in the door' variety is a theory which is not only unproved but
contrary to the evidence."); see also Allen, supra note 84, at 344 (observing that "[m]any courts
have had difficulty jumping the conceptual hurdle that such confusion is prohibited when there
is no likelihood 'confused' potential purchasers will continue to be confused when they actually
complete their purchasing decisions").
117. See Allen, supra note 84, at 355 n.180 (noting that "[c]ourts embracing the concept
of pre-sale confusion have... emphasized the proprietary interest rationale in finding action-
able likelihood of confusion").
118. Id.
119. See generally Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d 254 (2d Cir.
1987) (adjudicating dispute between two companies offering petroleum-related products);
Grotrian, Helfferich, Schulz, Th. Steinweg Naehf. v. Steinway & Sons, 523 F.2d 1331 (2d Cir.
1975) (concerning dispute between two piano manufacturers); McNeil-PPC v. Guardian Drug
Co., 984 F. Supp. 1066 (ED. Mich. 1997) (resolving dispute between drug companies manufac-
turing digestive aids for lactose-intolerant persons); SecuraComm Consulting, Inc. v. Secura-
Corn, Inc., 984 F. Supp. 286 (D.N.J. 1997) (involving dispute between manufacturers of large-
scale security systems), rev'd on other grounds, 166 F.3d 182 (3d Cir. 1999); Pebble Beach Co.
v. Tour 18 , Ltd., 942 F. Supp. 1513 (SD. Tex- 1996) (analyzing dispute between owners of
golf courses with similar holes); Blockbuster Entm't v. Laylco, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 505 (ED.
Mich. 1994) (adjudicating dispute between two video rental store companies); Jordache Enters.
v. Levi Strauss & Co., 841 F. Supp. 506 (SD.N.Y. 1993) (deciding dispute between two jeans
manufacturers); Sara Lee Corp. v. Kayser-Roth Corp., No. 6:92CV00460, 1992 WL 436279,
at *24 (W.DN.C. Dec. 1, 1992) (adjudicating dispute between two pantyhose manufacturers).
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marketing to the same narrow consumer base.120 This is a sensible way to
apply initial interest confusion because when the parties are not in the same
line of business, no competitive damage is done. 21 However, with the recent
growth of the Internet and the unique problems of trademarks in cyberspace,
courts have begun to apply the initial interest confusion doctrine outside of
these narrow situations."z
IV Initial Interest Confusion on the Internet
A. Metatagging
1. Brookfield Communications: The Ninth Circuit Opens the Door
The litigation in Brookfield Communications v. West Coast Entertain-
ment " arose when Brookfield, which made "MovieBuff' software for the
entertainment industry, attempted to register the domain name "moviebuff.
com. 'i124 Brookfield learned that the West Coast Entertainment, a video rental
store chain, had already registered the "moviebuff.com" domain.'2 Brook-
field subsequently obtained federal trademark rights to the "MovieBuff'
term.126 West Coast, which owned trademark rights to the term "The Movie
Buff's Movie Store," subsequently launched a web site atthe "moviebufficor"
domain containing a searchable database of entertainment industry informa-
tion. 27 The site also contained the terms "moviebuff' and "moviebuff.com"
in its metatags.'" Brookfield then brought a trademark infringement action in
120. See generally Elvis Presley Enters. v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188 (5th Cir. 1999) (consider-
ing dispute between Presley estate and nightclub owner marketing to fans of Elvis Presley);
Porsche Cars N. Am. v. Manny's Porshop, 972 F. Supp. 1128 (N.D. M. 1997) (analyzing
dispute between Porsche and shop marketing to Porsche owners); Foxworthy V. Custom Tees,
879 F. Supp. 1200 (ND. Ga. 1995)" (adjudicating dispute between comedian and t-shirt
company both marketing to fans of so-called "redneck humor").
121. See Charles E. Bruzga, Sophisticated Purchaser Defense Avoided Where Pre-Sale
Confiusion Is Rarmful-A BriefNote, 78 TRADMJMK REP. 659, 665 (1988) (arguing that pre-
sale confusion should be actionable only in situations where companies derive "crucial credibil-
ity" from association with competing trademark holders). But see Allen, supra note 84, at 344
(arguing this approach would be difficult to apply in practice).
122. See infra Part IV (discussing application of initial interest confusion doctrine to
Internet trademark disputes).
123. 174 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 1999).





128. Id. at 1043.
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federal court against West Coast.12 Afterthe district court denied Brookfield's
motion for aprelininaryinjunction, Brookfield appealedto the Ninth Circuit.'
The Ninth Circuit first determined that Brookfield had established a suf-
ficient claim to be considered the senior user of the "moviebuff' term.M 3 The
court then analyzed the trademark infringement claims relating to the use ofthe
domain name "moviebuff.comn"" under the eight-factor test governing likeli-
hood of confusion analysis inthe Ninth Circuit. 33 The court found that Brook-
field had demonstrated a likelihood of success on its claim that West Coast's
use of the "moviebuff.com" domain constituted trademark infringement.'34
The court then turned its attention to the use of the terms "moviebuff'
and "moviebufficom" in West Coast's metatags. 35 Unlike prior decisions
analyzing alleged trademark violations in both a domain name and metatags,
the Ninth Circuit made it clear that the metatag analysis would apply no
matter what domain name West Coast chose.136 However, rather than analyz-
ing the metatag issue under the eight-factor Sleekcraft test, the court stated
that 'The traditional eight-factor test is not well-suited for analyzing the meta-
tags issue" and proceeded to consider only whether the metatags caused initial
interest confusion. 37 The court conceded that it was unlikely that consumers
would be confused for any appreciable length of time as to the source or
sponsorship of West Coast's site or think it was affiliated with Brookfield in
any way, because users who access the West Coast site as a result of such a
search will see that the domain name of the site is "westcoastvideo.com.'
131
However, the court analogized the use ofthe "moviebuff' term in West Coast's
metatags to the facts of Blockbuster Entertainment v. Laylco, 39 in which a
store posted a sign with a name similar to a competitor's trademark in order




131. Id. at 1053.
132. Id. at 1054-61.
133. See AMF Inc. v. Slekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341,348-49 (9th Cir. 1979) (setting out
eight factor test including strength of mark, proximity of goods, similarity of marks, evidence
of actual confusion, marketing channels used, type of goods and degree of care likely to be
exercised by purchaser, defendant's intent in selecting mark, and likelihood of expansion of
product lines).
134. Brookfeld Communications, 174 F3d at 1061.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1062.
137. Id. at 1062 n. 24.
138. Id. at 1062.
139. 869 F. Supp. 505 (E-D. Mich. 1994).
140. See Blockbuster Enters. v. Laylco, 869 F. Supp. 505,512-13 (E-D. Mich. 1994) (find-
1319
57 WASH. &LEE L. REV 1303 (2000)
Suppose West Coast's competitor (let's call it "Blockbuster") puts up a
billboard on a highway reading - "West Coast Video: 2 miles ahead at
Exit 7" - where West Coast is really located at Exit 8 but Blockbuster is
located at Exit 7. Customers looking for West Coast's store will pull off
at Exit 7 and drive around looking for it. Unable to locate West Coast, but
seeing the Blockbuster store right by the highway entrance, they may
simply rent there.... Customers are not confused in the narrow sense:
they are fully aware that they are purchasing from Blockbuster and they
have no reason to believe that Blockbuster is related to, or in any way
sponsored by, West Coast.'
The court further noted that West Coast had acted affirmatively in
placing Brookfield's trademarks within its metatags, and could therefore not
be considered a passive infringer taking advantage of a situation in which
confusion was likely to exist.'4 2 Based on the initial interest confusion created
by West Coast's use ofthe "moviebuff' metatags, the Ninth Circuit concluded
that Brookfield had established a likelihood of success on the merits of its
infringement claim. 143  The court noted that this form of confusion was
"exactly what the trademark laws are designed to prevent.' 44
2. Playboy Enterprises v. Welles:
Placing Limits on Initial Interest Confusion
While Brookfield Communications applied a broad version of initial
interest confusion to a metatag dispute, the first district court within the Ninth
Circuit to analyze initial interest confusion in a metatagging case has applied
a more limited version of the doctrine. The litigation in Playboy Enterprises
v. Welles 45 arose from a web site at "www.terriwelles.com" maintained by
ing defendant's use of "Video Busters" store name confusingly similar to plaintiff's "Block-
buster" mark). In Blockbuster, the plaintiff objected to the defendant's use of the name "Video
Busters" for its video rental stores on the grounds that customers would confuse it with the
plaintiff's "Blockbuster" stores. Id. at 508. The defendant argued that customers were not likely
to be confused by the time they actually rented movies in Video Busters stores and that there-
fore any confusion the similar names may have caused was not actionable under the Lanham
Act. Id. at 512-13. The court rejectd this argument, finding that the relevant confusion was
that Video Busters stores might attract potential customers based on the similarity to the Block-
buster name. Id. at 513. The court conceded that these customers would eventually realize that
the stores were not related, but found this irrelevant because the relevant confusion was that
which drew the customers to the store in the first place. Id. Therefore, the court granted
Blockbuster's motion for a preliminary injunction. Id. at 516.
141. Brookfleld Communications, 174 F.3 d at 1064.
142. Id. at 1065.
143. Id. at 1066.
144. Id.
145. 78 F. Supp. 2d 1066 (S.D. Cal. 1999).
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Terri Welles, a former Playboy Magazine Playmate of the Year." The site
directly referred to Welles as "Playboy Playmate of the Year 1981 'W47 and
contained the marks "playboy," "playmate," and "playmate ofthe year" within
its metatags. 48 Playboy objected to the site using its trademarks and con-
tended that under Brookfield Communications, it had shown a sufficient likeli-
hood of confusion as to the use of its trademarks in Welles' metatags on the
basis of initial interest confusion. 49 There was evidence that many people
who entered "playboy" or "playmate" into a search engine were looking for
the official Playboy site."5 This, according to the court, indicated "at least a
showing of some 'initial interest confusion.""
Unlike the Ninth Circuit in Brookfield, the court in Welles did not end its
analysis with the finding of initial interest confusion. 52 The decision instead
adopted a more limited view of the initial interest concept, stating that while
a finding of initial interest confusion can be a basis for finding a likelihood of
confusion, initial interest confusion does not lead ipso facto to a finding of
likelihood of confusion. 5 3 The court listed three factors, culled from earlier
decisions applying initial interest confusion, that are relevant in determining
whether there is a likelihood of confusion: (1) whether the initial interest
confusion was "damaging and wrongful,"" (2) whether the initial interest con-
fusion could lead the consumer to "believe there is some connection between
the two and therefore develop an interest in the [defendant's] line that it
would otherwise not have,' 55 and (3) whether the initial interest confusion
"offers an opportunity for sale not otherwise available by enabling defendant
to interest prospective consumers by confusion withthe plaintiff's product. 05
6
Playboy had not adequately demonstrated the existence of any of these fac-
tors. 157 The court also inferred from language in Brookfield Communications
146. Playboy Enters. v. Wellcs, 78 F. Supp. 2d 1066,1071 (S.D. Cal. 1999).
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1092.
149. Id.




154. Id. (citing Koppers Co. v. Krupp-Koppers Gmb-, 517 F. Supp. 836, 844 (WD. Pa.
1981)).
155. Id. (citing Kompan A.S. v. Park Struetures, Inc., 890 F. Supp. 167,1180 (N.D.N.Y.
1995)).
156. Id. (citing Sara Lee Corp. v. Kayser-Roth Corp., No. 6:92CV00460, 1992 WL
436279, at *24 (W.D.N.C. Dec. 1,1992)).
157. Id at 1094-95.
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that the intent of the alleged infringer was a factor to be considered.' The
court found Welles did not have malicious intent; she was not attempting to
capitalize on Playboy's name and goodwill to divert Playboy's customers to
her site. 59 Her intent was merely to describe her website in a way which
would allow search engines to accurately index her page, which she could not
have done without using the terms "playboy" and "playmate of the year."'"
While Welles placed limitations on the Ninth Circuit's understanding of
initial interest confusion, other courts have expanded the contours of initial
interest confusion as defined inBrookfield Communications. The court inNew
York State Society ofCertifiedPublicAccountants v. Eric Louis Associates'
wielded the doctrinal brush of initial interest confusion with an even broader
stroke than the Ninth Circuit.' 62 Eric Louis Associates dealt with ajob place-
ment firm for accounting professionals which used the term ' tNYSSCPA" (a
service mark ofthe New York State Society of Certified Public Accountants)
in the metatags of its web sites. 63 Ignoring the Ninth Circuit's warnings about
"excessive rigidity,"'" Judge Sand in Eric Louis Associates made the con-
clusory statement that ELA's "use of the 'nysscpa.com' domain name and the
'nysscpa' meta-tag caused a likelihood of confusion because it created initial
158. Id. at 1095.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. 79 F. Supp. 2d 331 (S.D.Y. 1999).
162. See New York State Soc'y of Certified Pub. Accountants v. Eric Louis Assocs., 79
F. Supp. 2d 331, 342-43 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (recognizing and applying initial interest confusion).
In Eric LouisAssociates, the New York State Society of Certified Public Accountants objected
to the defendant, a professional job placement firm, using the domain name "nysscpacom" and
the metatag 'NYSSCPA" at that site and two others ("ericlouis.com" and "eric-louis.com"). Id.
at 339. The case came to the court in a somewhat unusual procedural posture because the
defendant had already consented to a permanent injunction barring the use of "nysscpa" in a
domain name or mctatags. Id. at 333. The sole issue before the court was the payment of
plaintiffs attorney fees, but the court needed to go into an analysis of whether there was indeed
trademark infringement or dilution to determine whether it should award attorney fees to
plaintiff. Id. at 334. The court analyzed the issue of initial interest confusion separately from
the Second Circuit's eight-factor likelihood of confusion test Id. at 342. The court rejected
Eric Louis Associates' (ELA's) arguments that the content of ELA's page, which included a
disclaimer, would dispel any confusion among web users looking for NYSSCPA's page. Id.
According to the court, the confusion that mattered was the initial, momentary confusion of web
browsers arriving at a web site that was not the one they were looking for. Id. The court found
that this initial interest confusion sufficed to establish likelihood of confusion and awarded
attorney fees to the plaintiff. Id. at 356.
163. Id. at339.
164. See Brookflield Communications, Inc. v.W. CoastEntm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036,1054
(9th Cir. 1999) ("We must be acutely aware of excessive rigidity when applying the law in the
Internet context; emerging technologies require a flexible approach.").
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interest confusion."' 65 The approach taken by Judge Sands basically eviscer-
ates the traditional multi-factor likelihood-of-confusion tests by considering
only whether the defendant has used the plaintiff's trademark in the defen-
dant's domain name or metatags.'" If so, according to this court, there is
trademark infiingement, regardless ofthe competitive proximity of the parties
or other factors.'" This approach obviously is broader than that taken by the
Ninth Circuit in Brookfield Communications."
B. Domain Names
1. Pre-Brookfield: Confusion Per Se?
Since the Ninth Circuit's decision inBrookfield Communications, several
courts also have extended the iitial interest confusion doctrine to domainname
disputes, a surprising development giventhat eventhe Brookfield Communica-
tions court thought that standard trademark infringement analysis sufficiently
addressed the domain name aspect of the dispute between Brookfield and West
Coast.169 However, even before Brookfield Communications, some courts were
truncating traditional likelihood of confusion analysis to hold that the brief
initial confusion of web users was actionable under the Lanham Act.
The court in Planned Parenthood Federation of America v. Bucci'7 o
provided a prime example of this early approach when it stated that domain
names are "external labels that, on their face, cause confusion among Interet
users.""' While not using the terminology of "pre-sale" or "initial interest"
165. EicLouisAssocs.,79F. Supp.2dat342.
166. See Nancy J. Felsten, Trademarks, Domain Names, Metatags, Cybersquafting, and
theInternet, 601 PI/PAT 25,284 (2000) (noting that Judge Sand's approach renders traditional
likelihood of confusion analysis irrelevant).
167. Id. at272.
168. See id. at 272-74 (arguing that Eric LouisAssociates extends Brookfield "in dubious
fashion" because "it appears to allow a plaintiff to 'bootstrap' likelihood of confusion without
evidence of competition between the parties, in a way perhaps not contemplated by Brook-
field").
169. See Brookfield Communications, 174 F.3d at 1054-61 (applying eight-factor likeli-
hood of confusion analysis to West Coast's use of"moviebuff.com" domain name).
170. 1997 WL 133313 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24,1997), affd, 152 F3d 920 (2d Cir. 1998), cerL
denied., 525 U.S. 834 (1998).
171. See Planned Parenthood Fed'n ofAm. v. Bucci,No. 97 CIV 0629,1997 WL 133313,
at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 1997) (granting preliminary injunction against defendant's use of
"www.plannedparenthood.com" domain name), affd, 152 F3d 920 (2d Cir. 1998). InPlanned
Parenthood, the defendant, a pro-life activist, registered the domain name "www.plannedparent
hood.com" and set up a home page with the admitted intent of intercepting pro-abortion Internet
users searching for the official site of Planned Parenthood. Id. at *2. The page contained
excerpts from an anti-abortion book but contained the words "Welcome to the Planned Parent-
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confusion, the court in Planned Parenthood clearly was applying initial
interest confusion because Judge Wood admitted that a reading of the actual
content on the defendant's site would quickly dispel any potential confusion.
172
According to the court, the harm was that "prospective users of plaintiff's
services... may fail to continue to search for plaintiff's own home page, due
to anger, frustration, or the belief that plaintiff's home page does not exist."'
173
The District Court for the Northern District of Iowa employed a similar
line of reasoning in Green Products Co. v. Independence Corn By-Products
Co.," 4 in which the court found that the defendant's use of "greenproducts.
corn" was analogous to the defendant posting a "Green Products" sign outside
its store in an effort to lure customers inside.175 The Green Products court
also added another twist when it stated that the defendant's registration of the
"greenproducts.com" domain, even without an accompanying web page, could
potentially cause "confusion about the corporate status of Green Products.' 
76
The court believed this type of confusion could cause economic damage to
hood Home Page!" at the top of the page. Id. The defendant argued that his speech was non-
commercial use of a trademark, but the court found that the "in commerce" requirement of the
Lanham Actwas satisfied by the advertisement ofthe book. Id. at *4. The court then found that
actual confusion was likely to exist because users looking for the official Planned Parenthood
home page would find the defendant's page instead. Id. at *8. The court noted that users would
have to expend time and energy accessing the defendant's web site, and that this was sufficient
confusion to find a likelihood of confusion. Id. at *12. The court granted the plaintiff's motion
for a preliminary injunction. Id.
172. See 4 McCARTHY, supra note 45, § 25:76 at n.37 (surmising that "[s]ince there was
no confusion of source once the user examined defendant's web site, the kind of confusion
involved must be 'initial interest' confusion").
173. Planned Parenthood, 1997 WL 133313, at *4.
174. 992 F. Supp. 1070 (ND. Iowa 1997).
175. See Green Prods. Co. v. Independence Corn By-Products Co., 992 F. Supp. 1070,
1077 (ND. Iowa 1997) (analogizing defendant's use of"greenproducts.com" domain name to
operation of store with "Green Products" advertising sign outside). In Green Products, the
parties were direct competitors in the corncob by-products industry. Id. at 1074. Independence
Corn By-Products Co. (ICBP) registered a number of domains formed by using the trade names
of their competitors, including "greenproducts.com." Id. Upon Green Products's motion for
a preliminary irjunction, the court analyzed Green Products' claims under a six-factor likeli-
hood of confusion test. Id. at 1075. The court pointed out that it was making no finding that
there would be a likelihood of confusion between the products of ICBP and Green Products.
Id. at 1077. However, the court found that "the use of plaintiff's trademark as defendant's own
domain name is likely to cause consumer confusion as to who owns the site," similar to a
hypothetical situation where a retail store advertises a competitor's trademark as its own store
name in an attempt to attract customers. Id. The court acknowledged that this interpretation
of confusion was different than that usually employed in trademark cases, but stated that an
intentionally deceptive use of a competitor's trademark as a way to lure customers away from
a competitor was another form of actionable confusion. Id. at 1078.
176. Id.
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Green Products if customers concluded that Green Products no longer existed
or that another company had purchased Green Products."'
On the other hand, the court in Tele-Tech Customer Care Management
(California) v. Tele-Tech Co. 11' declined to find that initial domain name con-
fusion was sufficient to constitute a likelihood of confusion for trademark
infringement purposes.' 9 In that case, the court conceded that there may be
brief initial confusion among Internet users entering the address '"t eleteclcom"
hoping to find the web site of Teletech Customer Care Management and instead
finding a site belonging to Tele-Tech.8 ° However, the court tersely dismissed
this confusion as irrelevant. 8 It is worth noting that in Teletech, the two
companies offered services that were substantially different,"e2 while in Green
Products the companies were direct competitors83 and inPlannedParenthood
the two parties, while not competitors in the economic sense, could be charac-
terized as competitors in the marketplace of ideas' 4 However, the Teletech
court's terse analysis seems to indicate thattthe iitial confusionwouldnothave
been actionable even had the two companies been direct competitors.'
The decision inBrookfield Communications itself is ambiguous as to this
type of confusion and whether or not it should be actionable under the Lan-
ham Act. 6 While the portion of the opinion dealing with metatags whole-
177. Id.
178. 977 F. Supp. 1407 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
179. See Teletech Customer Care Mgmt. (Cal.) v. Tele-Tech Co., 977 F. Supp. 1407,1414
(C.D. Cal. 1997) (finding initial confusion of web users not actionable under trademark laws).
In Teletech, the plaintiff, which provided customer service to Internet users, brought trademark
infringement and dilution actions against the defendant, which provided engineering services
to the telecommunications industry and used the domain name "teletechcom." Id. at 1409-10.
The court accepted Teletech's argument that there may be initial confusion among consumers
going to the "teletech.com" web site in hopes of finding the plaintiff's web page. Id. at 1410.
However, the court believed that this brief confusion was not the type of confusion the Lanham
Act was intended to address. Id. at 1414. Therefore, the court found no likelihood of confu-
sion, although it did conclude that the plaintiff was likely to prevail on its dilution claim. Id.
180. Id.atl41O.
181. See id. at 1414 ("This brief confusion is not cognizable under the trademark laws.").
182. See id. at 1409 (explaining different businesses of Teletech and Tele-Tech).
183. See Green Prods. Co. v. Independence Corn By-Prods. Co., 992 F. Supp. 1070,1074
(N.D. Iowa 1997) (characterizing Green Products and ICBP as direct competitors).
184. See Jon H. Oram, Will the Real Candidate Please Stand Up?. Political Parody on
the Internet, 5 J. brI.Zu.. PROP. L. 467,488 n.103 (1999) (describing parties in Planned Parent-
hood as competitors in marketplace of ideas).
185. See Teletech Customer Care Mgmt (Cal.) v. Tele-Tech Co., 977 F. Supp. 1407,1414
(C.D. Cal. 1997) (stating that "initial confusion of web browsers... is not cognizable under the
trademark laws").
186. See infra notes 187-89 and accompanying text (discussing Ninth Circuit's handling
of domain name infringement issue in Brookfield).
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heartedly embraced the initial interest confusion doctrine," the portion deal-
ing with the question of whether West Coast's use of the "moviebuff.com"
domain infringed on Brookfield's trademark relied on a traditional likelihood
of confusion analysis." In concluding that there was a likelihood of confu-
sion, the court placed a good deal of emphasis on the fact that Brookfield and
West Coast offered somewhat similar products and services:
If.... Brookfield and West Coast did not compete to any extent what-
soever, the likelihood of confusion would probably be remote. A Web
surfer who accessed "moviebufficom" and reached a web site advertising
the services of Schlumberger Ltd. (a large oil drilling company) would be
unlikely to think that Brookfield had entered the oil drilling business or
was sponsoringthe oil driller... Brookfield wouldbeartheheavyburden
of demonstrating (through other relevant factors) that consumers were
likely to be confused as to source or affiliation in such a circumstance.18
This language directly conflicts with the analysis of the Planned Parent-
hood court that domain names, on their face, cause confusion regardless of
such factors as the similarity of goods and services and the sophistication of
purchasers."9 Therefore, although the Ninth Circuit wholeheartedly embraced
initial interest confusion in the analysis of metatags, the court did not directly
address the issue of initial interest confusion in domain names but strongly
implied that it would only be actionable where the companies in question
offered similar goods or services.
2. Post-Brookfield: Three Different Directions
Since the decision inBrookfield Communications, courts have takenthree
distinct approaches in the analysis of initial interest confusion claims relating
to domain names. The first is that domain names on their face cause action-
able initial interest confusion." The second approach holds that initial
interest confusion is never actionable and that the only relevant confusion is
187. See Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036,
1062-63 (9th Cir. 1999) (recognizing initial interest confusion in context of metatag usage).
188. See id. at 1054-61 (analyzing domain name infringement claim under eight-factor
likelihood of confusion test).
189. Id. at 1056.
190. See Planned Parenthood Fed'n ofAn. v. Bucc, lNo. 97 CIV 0629,1997 VL 133313,
at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 1997) ("Defendant's domain name and home page address areexternal labels that, on their fimce, cause confusion among Internet users."), affid, 152 F.3d 920
(2d Cir. 1998), see also Sally M Abel, Reading the Tea Leaves: Drawing the Policing Line
in Cyberspace, 569 PLI/PAT 347,353 (1999) (recognizing inherent tension betweenBrookfleld
Communications and Planned Parenthood approaches to domain names).
191. See infra notes 194-200 and accompanying text (discussing Interstellar Starship
approach).
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that which affects a purchasing decision.192 The third approach accepts the
actionability of initial interest confusion in limited situations only where the
companies are in the same lines of business and there is an intent on the part
of the inf-inging site to capitalize on the goodwill of a mark to divert custom-
ers from the mark's owner.193
The first approach follows the example of the Planned Parenthood and
Green Products courts in stating that domain names in and of themselves can
cause confusion. Although the Ninth Circuit found domain name infringe-
ment under a traditional likelihood of confusion analysis in Brookfield Com-
munications, it returned to the domain name issue three months later in Inter-
stellar Starship Services v. Epix, Inc.194 and explicitly stated that initial interest
confusion was actionable in the domain name context.195 Interstellar Starship
illustrates how courts can use the initial interest confusion doctrine to find
trademark infringement where there is no competitive damage being done. In
Interstellar Starship, Epix, which manufactured circuit boards and image
acquisition software, objected to ISS's use of the "epix.com" domain." ISS
was not using the domain to compete with Epix in any way; in fact, ISS was
using the domainto show pictures of atheatre group called the "Clinton Street
Cabaret.' 1 The district court found that because users could not purchase a
circuit board from "epix.com" and would not be expecting pictures of a theatre
group from Epix, Inc., there was no likelihood of confusion." The Ninth
Circuit reversed, speculating that a customer could view the photos on ISS's
web site and decide to give IS S's services a try, even though customers might
192. See infra notes 201-12 and accompanying text (discussing Clue Computing ap-
proach).
193. See infra notes 213-28 and accompanying text (discussing The Network Network
appro h).
194. 184 F3d 1107(9th Cir. 1999),cert denied, 120 S. Ct. 1161 (2000).
195. See Interstellar Starship Servs. v. Epix, Inc., 184 F.3d 1107, 1112 (9th Cir. 1999)
(reversing district court's denial of preliminary injunction against defendant's use of"epix.com"
domain name), cert denied, 120 S. Ct 1161 (2000). In Interstellar Starship, the defendant
(ISS) maintained a web page at "www.epixcom." Id. at 1109. The defendant used the page to
show photographs of a theatre group called the "Clinton Street Cabaret" Id. The plaintiff
objected to ISS's use of the "epicom" domain name, claiming that it constituted trademark
infringement, an argument which the district court had rejected. Id. at 1110. However, the
Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded, finding that there was not enough evidence in the record
to conclude as a matter of law that the defendant's use of the "epixcom" domain was likely to
cause confusion. Id. at 1112.
196. Id.at1108-09.
197. Id. at 1109.
198. See Interstellar Starship Servs. v. Epix, Inc., 983 F. Supp. 1331, 1336 (D. Or. 1997)
(describing contents of "epix.com" web page), rev'd, 184 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 1999), cert.
denied, 120 S. Ct 1161 (2000), modified on remand, F. Supp. 2d__, 2001 WL 10885 (D.
Or. Jan. 3,2001).
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not actually be confused into thinking there was a connection between ISS
and Epix.1 The court appeared to be confused as to the purpose of the "epix.
corn" web site.20 It is therefore difficult to determine whether the court would
have applied initial interest confusion had the court been satisfied that there
was no danger of competitive damage. However, given the lack of any
competitive proximity between ISS and Epix, this decision is best placed in
the Planned Parenthood line of cases.
The second view, illustrated by two decisions ofthe District Court for the
District of Massachusetts, follows the lead of the Teletech court which held
that the momentary confusion of web users arriving at a site other than the one
they are looking for is not sufficient to establish a likelihood of confusion."0 '
The court in CCBN.com, Inc. v. c-Call.com, Inc.,2I stated that the initial "de
minimus" confusion of web browsers who might be briefly confused was not
relevant to a likelihood of confusion.2 3 The court relied on First Circuit
precedents which held that the only confusion that mattered was that affecting
the ultimate purchasing decision.2°
One month later, inHasbro, Inc. v. Clue Computing, Inc.2 °s another court
in the same district went a step further and explicitly repudiated the Interstel-
lar Starship approach.2 In Clue Computing, the manufacturer of the board
199. Interstellar Starship, 184 F3d at 1111.
200. See id. at 1109 (stating that "[t]he record does not make crystal clear the precise nature
of ISS's business or its use of the 'epixcom" web page").
201. See supra notes 178-85 and accompanying text (discussing Teletech).
202. 73 F. Supp. 2d 106 (D. Mass. 1999).
203. See CCBN.com, Inc. v. c-Call.com, Inc., 73 F. Supp. 2d 106, 107 (D. Mass. 1999)
(denying plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction). In CCBM.com, the plaintiff (CCBN)
used the domain name "stretevents.com" to provide stock market information to investment
professionals. Id. at 107. The plaintiff moved for a preliminary injunction to prevent the
defendant from using the domain name "streetfusion.com" to provide a similar service. Id. In
determining whether there was a likelihood of confusion, the court examined evidence consist-
ing of up to twenty incidents wherein subscribers and investment professionals confused the two
services. Id. at 113. The court noted that CCBN had failed to show that there was confusion
among sophisticated investment professionals at the time of any purchasing decision. Id. This
"de minimus" confusion which did not affect the ultimate purchasing decision was of minimal
relevance to the likelihood of confusion analysis. Id. The court also found that the plaintiff had
not yet created enough goodwill in its trademark for the defendant to usurp. Id. at 114. The
court concluded that CCBN had not presented a sufficient showing of a realistic likelihood of
confusion and denied the motion for a preliminary injunction. Id. at 115.
204. Id. at 113 (citing Int'l Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. Wmship Green
Nursing Ctr., 103 F3d 196, 201 (1st Cir. 1996); Lang v. Retirement Living Publ'g Co., Inc.,
949 F.2d 576,583 (2d Cir. 1991); Astra Pharm. Prods. v. Beckman Instruments, 718 F.2d 1201,
1207 (1st Cir. 1983)).
205. 66F. Supp.2d117 (D. Mass. 1999),aff'd,232F3d1(lstCir.2000).
206. See Hasbro, Inc. v. Clue Computing, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 2d 117,125 (D. Mass. 1999)
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game "CLUE" sued Clue Computing, a computer consulting corporation that
had registered the domain name "clue.com. ''2 ° The court analyzed the plain-
tiff's claims under the eight-factor test used in the First Circuit."' As to the
sixth factor, the existence of actual confusion, the court found that the plain-
tiff's evidence of actual confusion (three e-mails sent to the clue.corn site's
webmaster inquiring about the board game CLUE) were not sufficient to meet
the First Circuit's demands of "reasonable confusion."2" The court then
considered the possibility that there might be initial interest confusion in light
of the recent decisions in Brookfield Communications and Interstellar
Starship.1 ° However, the court found that the possibility that a user typing
"clue.com" into a browser expecting to be taken to a web site for the board
game "CLUE" may be momentarily confused and have to resort to a search
engine to find the desired information was an "inconvenience" that was "not
substantial enough to be legally significant." '' On appeal, the First Circuit
affirmed and stated that given the minimal nature ofthe confusion at issue, the
trial court's "refusal to enter the initial interest confusion thicket is well
taken."
212
The third approach to initial interest confusion in the domain name
context accepts the basic holding of Interstellar Starship that such confusion
is actionable, but limits applicability of the doctrine to situations where the
two companies offer related goods or services. In The Network Network v.
CBS, ' a federal court in California was faced with a dispute between The
Network Network, a company that trains information technology profession-
als, 2 4 and CBS, owner of The Nashville Network, a cable television station
commonly known as TNN. 15  The Network Network had registered the
(endorsing Teletech view and recognizing disagreement with Interstellar Starship), affld, 232
F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2000).
207. Id. at 119-20.
208. Id. at 121-26.
209. Id. at 124. The court further noted that any actual confusion that Hasbro had demon-
strated was confusion "resulting from the consuming public's camlessness, indifference, or
ennui" which was not sufficient to find a reasonable likelihod of confusion. Id. (citing Int'l




212. Hasbro, Inc. v. Clue Computing, Inc., 232 F.3d 1,4(st Cir. 2000), aif'gHasbro, Inc.
v. Clue Computing, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 2d 117 (D. Mass. 1999).
213. No. CV 98-1349 NM, 2000 WL 362016, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 19,2000).
214. The NetworkNetwork v. CBS, Inc., No. CV 98-1349 NM, 2000 WL 362016, at *2
(C.D. Cal. Jan. 19,2000).
215. Id. at*1.
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domain name 'tim.com" and was seeking a declaratory judgment that its use
of the "hi.com" domain did not infringe on CBS's tramark rights.216 CBS
argued that The Network Network's use of the "tn.com" domain name would
cause initial interest confusion because consumers looking for the web site of
the Nashville Network at "tnn.com" would find the Network Network's site
instead and possibly become interested in the services offered there.217 The
court pointed out the absurdity ofthis argument, stating "unlikely indeed is the
hapless Internet searcher who, unable to find information on the schedule of
upcoming NASCAR broadcasts or 'Dukes offHazzard' reruns, decides to give
up and purchase a computer network maintenance seminar instead. '" 218 The
court emphatically stated that initial interest confusion was not actionable
where the goods and services were dissimilar and granted The Network
Network's motion for a preliminary injunction.219
Courts applying this approach have taken a more restrictive view of the
necessary competitive proximity than the Ninth Circuit did in Brookfield
Communications. InBrookfield, the court concluded that the two parties were
competitors because they were both in the movie business, even though
Brookfield sold software to sophisticated Hollywood professionals and West
Coast offered a database for casual movie fans.' A narrower view of com-
petitive proximity was illustrated by BigStar Entertainment, Inc., v. Next Big
Star, Inc.,"1 in which the plaintif sold videos and movie memorabilia and the
defendant operated an online talent search.' In BigStar, the court stated that
216. Id.
217. Id. at*8.
218. Id. at *9.
219. Id.
220. See Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. W. Coast Entme't, 174 F.3d 1036, 1056 (9th
Cir. 1999) (stating that parties' products were in close competitive proximity).
221. 105 F. Supp. 2d 185 (SDN.Y. 2000).
222. See BigStar Entm't, Inc. v. Next Big Star, Inc., 105 F. Supp. 2d 185,211 (S.D.N.Y.
2000) (declining to apply doctrine of initial interest confusion). In BigStar, plaintiff BigStar
Entertainment sold videos and offered related information about the film industry through its
website at "www.bigstar.com." Id. at 188-89. The defendant was a recently established talent
search company which established a website at 'www.ne)xbigstar.com" to provide information
about their talent search competition. Id. at 190-91. After finding there was unlikely to be
traditional source confusion among consumers, the court then considered whether Next Big
Star's use of the "nextbigstar.com"' domain caused initial interest confusion, finally concluding
that it did not Id. at 207-211. The BigStar Entertainment court distinguished Brookfield
Communications on several grounds. Id. Most importantly, the court found that the two parties
were not in direct competition with each other. Id. at 210. The court noted that both parties did
"transact business in somewhat different corners of the same general market." Id. at 211.
However, unlike the Ninth Circuit in Brookfield Communications, the BigStar court was not
willing to characterize the parties as competitors for purposes of the infringement analysis. Id.
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competitive proximity was necessary to apply initial interest confusion, but
decided that there was insufficient competitive proximity between the prod-
ucts and services offered, even though both parties were in the entertainment
industry. 23 The court stated that while "both parties transact business in
somewhat different comers of the same general market, [the court] finds diffi-
culty in substantially equating their products for the purposes of assessing the
likelihood of confusion." 4
A slight variation on this third approach was illustrated by the decision
in Northland Insurance Companies v. Blaylock,' a domain name case in the
District of Minnesota.1 6 In that case, the court stated that the key factor in
determining whether initial interest confusion was actionable was whether the
defendant had a "commercial incentive or motive in using plaintiff's mark to
attract 'initial interest."" ' m This focus on the potential commercial benefit to
the defendant is very similar to the focus on the competitive proximity of the
parties' products, because in cases where the products are not in competitive
The court noted several ways in which the lines of business of the respective parties differed.
Id. The plaintiff sold products such as videocassettes and DVDs to movie fans while defendants
sold a service, the opportunity to compete in a talent competition, to aspiring actors, singers,
and dancers. Id. Although both parties offered some supplementary entertainment information,
such as celebrity interviews and chat rooms, this "slight overlap" was not enough for the court
to characterize the parties as competitors. Id. at 212. The court found no likelihood of confu-
sion and denied the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction. Id. at 220.
223. Id. at212.
224. Id. at211.
225. 115 F. Supp. 2d 1108 (D. Mlnn. 2000).
226. See Northland Ins. Cos. v. Blaylock, 115 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1122 (D. 1Mlnn. 2000)
(determining that plaintiff had failed to demonstrate sufficient likelihood of confusion to
constitute violation of Lanham Act). In NortAlandlnsurance, the defendant, a former customer
of the plaintiff insurance company, became disgruntled with the company during a dispute over
a denied insurance claim. Id. at 1114. The defendant created a web site at "northlandinsurance.
coin" to complain about his experiences with the plaintiff and provide a forum for other
"victims" of the plaintiff. Id. The plaintiff filed a suit claiming that the defendant's use of the
domain name "northlandinsurance.com" constituted trademark infringement, trademark dilution,
unfair competition, and a violation of the federal Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act
(ACPA). Id. During its analysis of the trademark infringement claim, the court considered the
plaintiff's argument that the defendant's use of the "northlandinsurance.
con" domain was likely to cause initial interest confusion among consumers. Id. at 1119-21.
The court first noted that the Eighth Circuit had not yet accepted the validity of the initial
interest confusion doctrine. Id. at 1119. The court then analyzed initial interest confusion cases
from other circuits and concluded that in most of those cases, the defendant stood to gain
financially from the initial confusion by attracting consumers at the expense of the plaintiff. Id.
at 1120. Under the facts as the court understood them, the plaintiff had nothing to gain
financially by using the "northlandinsurance.com" domain. Id. at 1121. Therefore, the court
determined, the initial interest confusion doctrine was not applicable. Id.
227. Id. at 1120.
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proximity, there will be no potential material or financial gain on the part of
the defendant.ms
V The Problems with Initial Interest Confusion on the Internet
A. Initial Interest Confusion Doctrine Does Not Serve the First Goal
of Trademark Law
Pre-Internet initial interest confusion cases focused almost exclusively on
the "proprietary interest" rationale of trademark protection.' In these cases,
courts used the initial interest confusion doctrine as a tool to combat unfair
competition by preventing one company from attracting initial consumer inter-
est through the misleading use of another company's trademark. 3 However,
many cases applying initial interest confusion in the Internet context have dis-
cussed variations of the primary goal of trademark law, protecting the reason-
able expectations ofconsumers.3 Courts considering initial interest confusion
in Internettrademark disputeshave statedthatthere aretwo basic ways consum-
ers can search for a web site. The first is by "guessing" that the site will be the
company name or trademark followed by ".com", and the second is through the
use of a search engine. 2 Ifthese are the consumer expectations that the initial
interest confusion doctrine is designed to protect, it must be determined
whether these expectations really exist and whether they are reasonable.
228. See Checkpoint Sys., Inc. v. Check Point Software Techs., Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 427,
462 (D.N.J. 2000) (Where... the companies are non-competitors, initial interest confusion
does not have the same consequences, because there is no substituted product to buy from the
junior user.").
229. See supra notes 117-121 and accompanying text (providing overview of pre-Intemet
initial interest confusion cases and explaining how courts focused on need to protect against
unfair competition).
230. Id.
231. See, e.g., New York State Soc'y of Certified Pub. Accountants v. Eric Louis Associ-
ates, 79 F. Supp. 2d 331,342 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (stating that Internet users "using ['NYSSCPA'
as a search term] are expecting to arrive at the Society's web site. When they arrive instead at
Defendant's web site, they cannot help being confused"); Jews for Jesus v. Brodsky, 993 F.
Supp. 282,303 (D.NJ. 1998) ("[A] user may find his or her way to the Defendant Internet site
and then may be confused."), affid, 159 F.3d 1351 (3d Cir. 1998); Planned Parenthood Fed'n
ofAm. v. Buc, No. 97 CIV 0629,1997 WL 133313, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24,1997) (stating
domain names "cause Internet users who seek plaintiff's web site to expend time and energy
accessing defendant's web site"), aff'd, 152 F.3d 920 (2d Cir. 1998).
232. See, e.g., Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F3d 1036,
1044 (9th Cir. 1999) ("[A web user] has two principal options: trying to guess the domain name
or seeking the assistance of an Internet 'search engine.'"); Playboy Enters. v. Welles, 78 F. Supp.
2d 1066, 1091 (S.D. Cal. 1999) ("Users searching for a specific website can either type it into
a web browser to access the site directly, or they can utilize a 'search engine.'"); SNA, Inc. v.
Array, 51 F. Supp. 2d 542, 552 n.9 (ED. Pa. 1999) ("Users searching for a specific Web site
have two options... they can type the address into a browser [or] rely on 'search engines.'").
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The first expectation, which many domain name cases address, is that
web users will be able to find the web site of a product or company by simply
typing the name of the product or company followed by ".com."t 3 The
validation of this "expectation" by courts dealing with Interet trademark dis-
putes reflects unrealistic judicial views about the nature ofthe Interet and the
sophistication of its users? Guessing domain names is a practice that shows
"carelessness, indifference, or ennui' SS in that it is a relatively inefficient way
of finding information on the Internet." While it may succeed more often
than not, there are many times when the web page of a famous trademark is
not located at "www.trademark.com231
The fact that courts continue to encourage web users to guess domain
names reflects a continuing judicial view that Internet users lack sophistica-
tion, particularly in relation to consumers of more conventional forms of
media."5 For example, in Cox Communications v. SusquehannaBroadcasting
Co., 9 the court was faced with a dispute between two radio stations in the
same market advertising themselves as "99 FM."240 The court declined to find
233. See, e.g., Sporty's Farm v. Sportsman's Market, 202 F3d 489,493 (2d Cir. 2000)
("The most common method of locating an unknown domain is simply to type in the company
name or logo with the suffix .com."I cert denied, 120 S. Ct. 2719 (2000);Brookfteld Commu-
nications, 174 F3d at 1045 ("Web users often assume, as a rule ofthumb, that the domain name
of a particular company will be the company name followed by '.com.'"); Cardservice Int'l, Inc.
v. McGee, 950 F. Supp. 737, 741 (ED. Va. 1997) ("A customer who is unsure about a com-
pany's domain name will often guess that the domain name is also the company's name."); 4
MCCARTHY, supra note 45, § 25.73 ("Mhrough habit and convention, Interact users have come
to expect that to reach the web site of a company they should be able to type in the name of the
company or its major trademark."); Swartz, supra note 80, at 1491-92 ("Internet users often
guess that a product's trademark also serves as the domain name that accesses a website with
information about the product.").
234. See Ion H. Oram, Case Note, The Costs of Confuion in Cyberspace, 107 YALE L.J.
869, 871 (1997) (criticizing reasoning behind Planned Parenthood decision).
235. Hasbro, Inc. v. Clue Computing, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 2d 117,124 (D. Mass. 1999), affid,
232 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2000).
236. See Oram, supra note 234, at 873 (arguing that Planned Parenthood court "should
have equated the practice of guessing domain names with user carelessness").
237. See The Network Network v. CBS, Inc., No. CV 98-1349 NM, 2000 WL 362016, at
*5 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 19,2000) (stating that "[g]iven the limited number of letters in the alphabet,
and the tendency toward the use of abbreviations in commerce generally and in domain names
in particular, it is inevitable that consumers will often guess wrong").
238. See Oram, supra note 234, at 871 (criticizing Planned Parenthood court for holding
Internet users to extremely low standard of sophistication and implying they would be unable
to understand "historic enmity" between pro-choice and pro-life forces).
239. 620 F. Supp. 143 (C.D. Ga. 1985).
240. See Cox Communications v. Susquehanna Broad. Co., 620 F. Supp. 143, 145 (C.D.
Ga. 1985) (finding no likelihood of confusion and denying plaintiff's motion for preliminary
injunction). In Cox Communications, the plaintiff owned an FM radio frequency at 98.5
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a likelihood of confusion, stating that any confusion was "minimal" and due
to 'ttotal inattention and disinterest" among consumers. 41 The court in Cox
Communications attributed a reasonable level of sophistication (and an
accompanying responsibility) to radio listeners when it stated that "[i]f a
listener really cares about which of the two stations he is listening to, it is
difficult to believe that his confusion will last past the first station break."'242
Unfortunately, some courts analyzing domain name disputes have not attrib-
uted the same sophistication to Internet users.24
Furthermore, this so-called "rule ofthumb"2" ignores the fundamental dif-
ference between trademarks and domain names. While several companies (in
different geographic areas or different lines of businesses) may have concur-
rent rights to the exact same trademark, only one company can own the ".com
domain name for that trademark.4 For example, Delta Air Lines, Delta
Faucets, Delta Dental, and several other companies in different lines of busi-
ness have trademark rights to the term "Delta", but only one of them can have
a web presence at "delta.com. "2 Therefore, an Internet user looking for Delta
Air Lines at "delta.com" may be briefly confused when he or she finds that
"delta.com" is actually the web site of Delta Financial Corporation. This is
obviously not the type of confusion that the Lanham Act was meant to remedy.
A guess is only a guess; web users have no legitimate expectations that
"guesstimating" will always find the web page they are looking for.247 Deci-
megahertz and the defendant was assigned the frequency of 99.7. Id. at 145. Both stations
played similar music and advertised themselves as "99 FM." Id. at 145-46. Cox, concerned that
its station was suffering in the ratings because of confusion with defendant's station, brought
a trademark infringement action against Susquehanna, claiming that it had rights to the term "99
FM." Id. at 146. The court found that some minimal confusion was inevitable due to the
similarity of the formats the two stations employed. Id. at 147-48. However, the court had
difficulty fitting this type of confusion into traditional trademark concepts and concluded that
Cox had failed to show a likelihood of confusion. Id. at 148.
241. Id. at 148.
242. Id.
243. See Oram, supra note 234, at 871 (suggesting that judiciary holds Internet users to
unreasonably low standard of sophistication). But cf Jews for Jesus v. Brodsky, 993 F. Supp.
282, 303 (D.N.J. 1998) (claiming that "many Internet users are not sophisticated enough to
distinguish between the subtle difference in the domain names of the parties"), aff'd, 159 F3d
1351 (3d Cir. 1998).
244. See Brookfield Communications, Inc. v.W. CoastEntm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036,1045
(9th Cir. 1999) ("Web users often assume, as a rule of thumb, thatthe domain name of a particu-
lar company will be the company name followed by ".com.").
245. See Swarz, supra note 76, at 1493 (pointing out difference between concurrent avail-
ability oftrademarks and uniqueness of domain names).
246. See id (noting that only one party can own specific individual web address).
247. See TheNetworkNetworkv. CBS, Inc., No. CV 98-1349 NM, 2000 WL 362016, at
*5 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2000) (stating that "it is inevitable that consumers will often guess wrong").
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sions such as Planned Parenthood and Interstellar Starship, in their rush to
protect "consumer expectations," have legitimized this approach at the ex-
pense of other, more efficient ways of finding information.2'
Courts in metatagging cases also have taken an overly paternalistic view
of Internet users.2" The need to protect the expectations of consumers enter-
ing terms into a search engine is a weak ground for imposition of trademark
infringement liability. Search engines can be powerful tools for finding
information, but at the present stage they are still in their infancy and one
cannot reasonably expect to always be able to find what one is looking for.Y°
For one thing, most information on the Internet cannot be found using searchengines; according to recent studies, no one search engine indexes more than
sixteen percent of all the pages on the web." 1 In addition, search engine
queries usually return hundreds or even thousands of results. 2 A user who
is attempting to find specific information via an Interet search engine must
be prepared to accept a modicum of "noise"" 3 and irrelevant search results.'
Most search engine users who enter a trademarked word or phrase into a
248. See Oram, supra note 234, at 873 (criticizing courts that legitimize guessing of
domain names instead of utilization of search engines and directory indexes).
249. See Mark T. Garrett, RecentDevelopments in TrademarkLaw, 8 TEX. IN1ELL PROP.
L.J. 101, 106 (1999) (suggesting Brookfield Communications court attributed low level of
sophistication to Internet users).
250. See Nathenson, supra note 39, at 118 (arguing that consumers do not always have
reasonable expectations of accurate search results).
251. Elizabeth Weise, Web Changes Direction to People Skills, USA TODAY, Jan. 24,
2000, at D1. The misconception that search engines index most or all of the available informa-
tion on the web is a common one. See also Sporty's Farm v. Sportsman's Mkt., 202 F.3d 489,
493 (2d Cir. 2000) (claiming that "[a] search engine will find all web pages on the Internet with
a particular word or phrase"), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 2719 (2000); Nat'l A-1 Adv., Inc. v.
Network Solutions, Inc., 121 F. Supp. 2d 156, 164, (D.NI. 2000) ("Search engines are
databases that list most sites accessible on the Web.").
252. See, e.g., Sporty's Farm, 202 F.3d at 493 ("Given the current state of search engine
technology, [a] search will often produce a list of hundreds of web sites through which the user
must sort in order to find what he or she is looking for."); Panavision Int'l v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d
1316, 1327 (9th Cir. 1998) ("Use of a 'search engine' can turn up hundreds of web sites.");
Oram, supra note 234, at 872 ("[S]earches... typically overwhelm the novice user by generat-
ing hundreds or thousands of site listings.").
253. See Nathenson, supra note 39, at 75 (defining noise). "Noise" in the search engine
context refers to the irrelevant information resulting from a search engine query. Id.
254. See, e.g., Nathenson, supra note 39, at 45 (suggesting that Microsoft's advertising,
rather than asking "Where do you want to go today?" should ask "How in the hell do you get
there?"); Oram, supra note 184, at 469 (comparing Internet to box of chocolates; "[y]ou can try
searching for the information you want, but you just never know what you're gonna get"); Tim
Jackson, The Case of the Invisib le Ink, FNANCIAL TIMES, Sept 22,1997, at 17 (stating that "[tlo
anyone who uses search engines regularly, all these assertions [of confusion] may seem
somewhat fanciful. When you type a string ofwords into [a search engine] you expect to see
many pages listed that have no relevance to the subject that interests you").
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search engine do not expect every result that the search engine returns to be
sponsored by or affiliated with the trademark owner."5
Additionally, it is reasonable to expect users to read the descriptions that
accompany the results of a search." In most cases, these descriptions will
contain additional information that will make it clear whether a certain page
is affiliated with the trademark owner.'5 The fact thatthe Brookfield Commu-
nications court failed to take this into account reflects the court's inability to
understand the mechanics of search engines. Search engines return a list of
results when a query is entered; they do not automatically take a user to
another site."5 There is a fundamental difference, which the Brookfield
Communications court failed to appreciate, between viewing a list of results
and being taken directly to another site (as one would when entering a domain
name). In most cases, a user will be able to tell from the list of results which
site is which before clicking on any of the results."9 The proper analogy is
not to West Coast putting up a billboard that advertises their store using
Brookflield's trademark, but to West Coast putting up a billboard right next to
a billboard for Brookfield.2"u
The court's billboard analogy is a more appropriate illustration of the
facts of Niton Corp. v. Radiation Monitoring Devices, Inc.," in which Radia-
tion Monitoring Devices (RMD) copied verbatim Niton's metatags on its own
web page.262 If a user entered "niton" into a search engine, RMD's web page
255. See Lastowka, supra note 41, at 866-67 (suggesting that consumers understand
"sparadexing" and are unlikely to be confused by irrelevant search results or believe they are
affiliated with trademark owners). Lastowka argued that search engine users are likely to view
irrelevant listings as a failure of search engine technology and not to assume that these sites
have any relation to the trademark's owner. Id.
256. Id.
257. See 2 JERovm GmSON, TRADEMARKPROTECION AND PRAcTIcE, § 5.11[7] (2000)
(explaining that descriptions accompanying links on search engine results page will often dispel
confusion).
258. See Playboy Enters. v. Welles, 78 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1091 (S.D. Cal. 1999) (noting
that search engines return list of hits in response to specific query).
259. See 2 GILSON, supra note 257, § 5.11[7] (explaining that descriptions accompanying
links on search engine results page will often dispel confusion).
260. See Garrett, supra note 249, at 106 (criticizing analogy employed by Ninth Circuit
in Brookfield Communications).
261. 27 F. Supp. 2d 102 (D. Mass. 1998).
262. See Niton Corp. v. Radiation Monitoring Devices, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 2d 102, 105 (D.
Mass. 1998) (granting preliminary injunction against defendant's use of plaintiff's metatags).
In Niton, both N'Aon and Radiation Monitoring Devices (RIMD) manufactured x-ray instruments
that detected the presence or absence of lead in paint Id. at 103. Niton's webmaster discovered
that RIMD had copied verbatim from Niton's website the descriptive metatags which included
phrases such as "The Home Page of Nirton Corporation, makers of the finest lead, radon, and
multi-element detectors." Id. at 104. The judge issued a preliminary injunction against RMD,
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would appear in the list of results with the description "the official web page
of Niton corporation."2" In that case, a user could claim legitimately to be
misdirected and confused by RMD's use ofthe Niton metatags.2" A searcher
for Brookfield's web site would not be misdirected when entering "movie-
buff' into a search engine unless he failed to carefully read the descriptions
of the returned pages and clicked on a link for West Coast's page instead of
Brookfield's.2' Any initial confusion therefore would be at least partially the
fault of the search engine user for failing to exercise proper care.
The Brookfield Communications court noted the fact that a search query
produces a list of results from which a user must select,2' but failed to give
this fact the proper significance.' One commentator has stated that the Ninth
Circuit's decision in Brookfield Communications relied
on a fundamental misunderstanding of the way in which Internet search
engines operate. Search engines donot"take" web surfers to any site, rather
they respond to requests for informationbyproviding lists of sites that...
are most likely to meet the surfer's needs. The surfer then chooses from
amongst the list of hyperlinks returned.... West Coast Video's use ofthe
metatag, "MovieBuff," would likely suffice to earn it a place on the results
listreturnedbymost search engines, butit could do no morethanthat The
surferwould still have to pick out the hyperlinkto West CoastVideo's site
from among all those returned before being "taken" to that site.2"
The failure to understand how search engines operate is a common
problem with legal criticisms of manipulative metatagging. The practice also
has been compared to dialing directory assistance to ask for Apple's number,
only to be given Microsoft's number instead.269 Obviously, a more appropri-
finding that Niton was likely to succeed in its argument that RMD's use of Niton's metatags
would confuse customers into believing that RMD was affiliated with or identical to Niton. Id.
at 105.
263. See 2 GILSON, supra note 257, § 5.11[7] (contrasting Niton with Brookfeld Commu-
nications).
264. Cf. Lawrence F. Grable, Cyber Pirates, Looting Trademarks on the Internet:
Brookfield v. West Coast, 36 TULSA L. 235, 252 (2000) (stating that Niton is "arguably the
best example of willful metatag infringement resulting in initial interest confusion").
265. Id.
266. See Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036,1062
(9th Cir. 1999) (recognizing that inputting tern into search engine results in list of hits).
267. See id. at 1064 (suggesting that search engine user looking for Brookfield's site will
be "misdirected" to West Coast's page).
268. See Dan McCuaig, Halve the Baby: An Obvious Solution to the Troubling Use of
Trademarks asMetatags, 183. MARSHAiLJ. COMPUTER&INFO. L. 643,663 (2000) (criticizing
reasoning of BrookJ9eld Communications court).
269. See Nathenson, supra note 39, at 46 n.15 (mentioning comparison to directory assis-
tance).
1337
57 WASH. &LEE L. REV 1303 (2000)
ate analogy is to receiving the number of Apple as well as those of Microsoft,
Compaq, and Dell. To use another analogy, manipulative metatagging is not
the same as ordering Coke and receiving Pepsi instead; it is more akin to
ordering Coke and having a waiter ask "Is Pepsi okay?"" ° The potential
consumer is faced with a number of alternate choices and must make a reason-
able, informed decision.
One decision which demonstrates aproperunderstanding of search engine
results is Bihari v. Gross,"n in which a disgruntled customer of an interior
design company created several web pages to criticize the company. 2 These
pages contained the name of the company, "Bihari Interiors," in their meta-
tags. 3 In denying the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, the court took
notice ofthe fact that a search for "Bihari Interiors" would return a list of re-
sults.Y74 This list would contain a list of web pages with accompanying descrip-
tions, andthe descriptions forthe defendant's sites (which read "[tihis site deals
with the problems experienced when hiring a ... designer. It discusses Mar-
ianne BihariL], fraud and deceit") would make it clear that the sites were not
affiliated with Bihari Interiors.2" Other courts analyzing metatagging cases
should follow the example of the Bihari court and keep in mind that a user will
be selecting from a list of results when entering a term into a search engine 2 76
270. See Link Law on the Internet" A Panel Discussion, 38 IDEA 197, 217 (1998)
(discussing analogies between metatagging and beverage ordering).
271. 119 F. Supp. 2d 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
272. See Bihari v. Gross, 119 F. Supp. 2d 309, 311 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (denying plaintiff's
motion for preliminary injunction enjoining defendants from using terms "Bihari" or "Bihari
Interiors" in metatags of defendant's web pages). In Bihari, the plaintiff operated Bihari
Interiors, a Manhattan interior design company. Id. at 312. The defendant was a former
customer of plaintiffs who became disgruntled with Bihari Interiors for a variety of reasons.
Id. The defendant registered the domain names "designscam.com" and "manhattaninterior
design.om" and created web pages at these domains criticizing the plaintiff and her company.
Id. at 313-14. Both of these pages contained the term "Bihari Interiors" within their metatags.
Id. at 313. The plaintiff brought a lawsuit claiming that this usage constituted a violation of the
Lanham Act Id. at 311. In its discussion of plaintiffs claims, the court discussed the possibil-
ity of initial interest confusion. Id. at 319-21. However, the court distinguished the facts of the
case from the facts in Brookfteld Communications. Id. The defendant's web site was not
intended to divert customers from the plaintiff's web site; in fact, the plaintiff did not even have
a web site for her company. Id. at 320. Additionally, the court noted that any search results for
the term "Bihari Interiors" which returned one of defendant's pages as a hit would include a
description of the page which would make it clear that the page was not sponsored by plaintiff.
Id. For these reasons, the court found that web users looking for plaintiff's page would not be
"tricked" into visiting the defendant's pages. Id. at 321.
273. Id. at 313.
274. Id. at 320.
275. Id.
276. See Matthew A. Kaminer, The Limitations of TrademarkLaw in Addressing Trade-
markKeywordBanners, 16 SANTA CLARACOMPUTER& HIGHTECHL . 35,52 (1999) (arguing
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Moreover, overly broad trademark liability will encourage the use of
"information-poor" search terms. Information-poor terms are frequently used
words which are not distinctive and do not convey specific, useful informa-
tion.Y7 Many of the most frequently searched terms, such as "sex," "mp3,"
and "chat" would qualify as information-poor.2 7 8 Information-rich terms are
those that are fairly distinctive, less frequently used, and capable only of a
limited number ofmeaningsY 9 Much as courts in domain name cases should
not legitimize the practice of "guessing" domain names, courts in metatagging
cases should not encourage the use of information-poor search terms. Con-
sumers should be expected to use targeted, information-rich search terms." °
Finally, a user who enters a company name or product name into a search
engine is not necessarily looking for the "official" site of that company or
trademark. This was a point made by the court inBally Total Fitness Holding
Corp. v. Faber,'l which granted summary judgment to a web page designer
who used the mark "Bally" in a site criticizing the health club chain.' The
court found that the average Internet user who inputs "Bally" into a search
engine wants not just the official Bally site, but all of the available informa-
tion on Bally.' While noting that some users may be searching for the
official Bally site, the court also indicated that many users will also want to
access the opinions of other Bally customers."'
that likelihood of confusion in metatagging cases may depend on how close together official site
and infringing site appear in search engine results).
277. See Nathenson, spra note 39, at 76 (defining information-poor search terms).
278. See Uncensored WordsList, athttp//www.searchwords.com/toplOOwhtim(lastvisited
Nov. 10, 2000) (listing "sex," "mp3," and "chat" among ten terms most frequently queried in
search engines).
279. See Nathenson, supra note 39, at 76 (defining information-rich search terms).
280. See id. at 113 (stating that reasonable consumers must be expected to use narrowly
targeted search terms).
281. 29 F. Supp. 2d 1161 (C.D. CaL 1998).
282. See Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp. v. Faber, 29 F. Supp. 2d 1161,1166 (C.D. Cal.
1998) (finding that defendant had demonstrated there was no likelihood that his "Bally Sucks"
web site would confuse web users). In Bally, the defendant owned the domain "www.compu
pk.com" and used this domain to maintain a variety of sites, including one called "Bally Sucks"
(located at http'/www.compupix.com/ballysucks). Id. at 1162. The site contained criticism of
the Bally health clubs and a forum for others to express their opinions of Bally. Id. at 1164-65.
Bally claimed that the unauthorized use of its trademarks on the page and in the address
constituted trademark infringement Id. at 1162. The court analyzed Bally's claims under the
Sleekcraft eight-factor test and granted summary judgment to the defendant, concluding that
Bally had not sufficiently demonstrated a likelihood of confusion. Id. at 1163-66.
283. Id. at 1165.
284. Id.; see also Playboy Enters. v. Welles, 78 F. Supp. 2d 1066,1095 (S.D. Cal. 1999)
(stating that "[n]ot all web searches utilizing the words 'Playboy' [and] 'Playmate' ... are
intended to find 'Playboy' goods orthe official 'Playboy' site").
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Cases such as Bihari and Bally understandthat Internetusers have unique
expectations which are different from the expectations of consumers in other
areas. Internet consumers do not expect to receive information from a search
engine in the same way that conventional consumers expect to receive infor-
mation from advertising." Application of the initial interest doctrine thus
does not serve the primary goal oftrademark law, protection ofthe reasonable
expectations of consumers.2e
B. Initial Interest Confusion Often Does Not Serve the Second Goal of
Trademark Law
If the application of the initial interest confusion doctrine in domain
name and metatagging cases does not serve the primary goal oftrademark law,
trademark infringement should only be based on initial interest confusion
when the second goal of trademark law comes into play.' As previously
discussed, the second goal focuses on the interests that trademark owners have
developed in their marks.' However, in many initial interest confusion
cases, the second goal is not served because the companies are not direct
competitors.29
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Brookfield Communications is a good
example of this problem. The most troubling aspect of the Brookfield Com-
munications decision is the way the court blithely jettisoned the traditional
eight-factor likelihood of confusion test in favor of a cursory, results-oriented
analysis.' While metatag issues may not fit well within the traditional
likelihood of confusion analysis, this does not mean that the entire framework
must be discarded. The likelihood of confusion factors were not meant to be
applied rigidly, but on a flexible case-by-case basis, with some factors obvi-
ously weighing more that others depending on the circumstances.' 1
285. See Shannon N. King, Case Comment, Brookflield Communications, Inc. v. West
Coast Entertainment Corp., 15 BERKEILY TECH. L.J. 313, 325 (2000) (comparing different
expectations of Internet consumers and traditional consumers).
286. See Nathenson, supra note 39, at 113 (arguing that rationale of protecting consumer
expectations has no validity where consumers have no reasonable expectations to protect).
287. See Checkpoint Sys., Inc. v. Check Point Software Techs., Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 427,
462 (D.NJ. 2000) ('Where... the companies are non-competitors, initial interest confusion
does not have the same consequences, because there is no substituted product to buy from the
junior user, and the senior user does not bear the prospect of harm.").
288. See supra Section IRA (discussing dual goals oftrademark law).
289. Id.
290. See Brooldield Communications, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036,1062
n.24 (9th Cir. 1999) ("[T]he traditional eight-factor test is not well-suited for analyzing the
metatags issue.").
291. See Playboy Enters. v. Welles, 78 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1081 (S.D. Cal. 1999) (stating
1340
THE INJTIL 1NTEREST CONFUSIONDOCTR1NE
The two factors to which the Ninth Circuit should have paid more
attention are the relatedness of the two companies' goods and services and the
degree of care that purchasers are likely to exercise.' Prior to Brookfield
Communications, almost all of the decisions basing trademark infiingement
on initial interest confusion had been in cases in which there was likely to be
some competitive damage done to the complaining party. 3 In most such
cases, the two parties offered very similar goods or services, and the potential
buyers were unsophisticated and unlikely to exercise a high degree of care. 4
Courts usually assume that potential consumers are more discerning when the
items at issue are expensive or of a type usually sold to expert buyers." s In
Brookfield Communications, while the products (entertainment industry-
related software and databases) were facially similar, West Coast's database
was geared towards the casual movie fan while Brookfield's was far more
detailed and intended for entertainment industry professionals, who should
have been considered expert buyers.' It is highly unlikely that, as the court
surmised, an entertainment industry professional using the "moviebuff' term
to search for Brookfield's detailed professional-oriented database simply
would decide to use West Coast's consumer-oriented database instead.2
The Welles court considered three additional factors (whether the confu-
sion was damaging and wrongful, whether the confusion would lead a con-
sumer to believe there was some connection between the two companies, and
whether the confusion offered a potential opportunity for sale by confusion
with the plaintiff's products) which are significant and sensible limitations on
the concept of initial interest confusion as the Ninth Circuit defined it.298
that "some factors will be much more significant than others, and the relative importance of each
factor will be case-dependent").
292. See Broolgf'eld Communications, Inc., 174 F.3d at 1053 (listing eight factors guiding
likelihood of confusion analysis).
293. See supra notes 119-20 and accompanying text (citing courts applying initial interest
confusion in these situations).
294. Id.
295. See OfficialAirline Guides, Inc. v. Goss, 6 F.3d 1385,1393 (9th Cir. 1993) (recogniz-
ing that confusion is unlikely when goods at issue are advertisements sold to expert ad buyers
for up to $16,000). The opposite is also true. See Beer Nuts, Inc. v. Clover Club Foods Co., 805
F.2d 920,926 (10th Cir. 1986) (recognizing that inexpensive snack foods are often impulse buys
and that customers are likely to exercise little care and are therefore more likely to be confused).
296. SeeBrookfieldCommunications, Inc. v. W. CoastEntm 't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036,1056
(9th Cir. 1999) (explaining differences between products but finding that companies were
properly characterized as competitors).
297. See id. at 1062 ("[A] sizeable number of consumers who were originally looking for
Brookfield's product will simply decide to utilize West Coast's offerings instead.").
298. See Welles, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 1094 (listing three additional factors courts should
consider in initial interest confusion claims).
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These factors essentially narrow the application of initial interest confusion
to situations in which a company is able to get a foot in the door at the ex-
pense of a competitor or there is some likelihood of competitive damage. 9
Had the Ninth Circuit considered these factors in Brookfield Communications,
the court probably would have decided the case differently because the
possibility of competitive damage to Brookflield was not very realistic, due to
the fact that the companies were marketing to different consumer bases.3O
Eric Louis Associates is another case in which the court should have
analyzed additional factors posited in Welles. The initial confusion created
by ELA's use of the metatag was not "damaging and wrongful" because ELA
and the NYSSCPA organization did not offer the same services. 0  Interet
users would be unlikely to search for the official NYSSCPA web site in the
hopes of finding job placement services, and thus there was no danger of the
type of "foot in the door" confusion found actionable in prior cases. Addition-
ally, the partners of Eric Louis Associates were themselves members of the
New York State Society of Certified Public Accountants. 302 Therefore, the
'nyssepa' metatag was a relevant indexing term, and its use should have
qualified as a descriptive fair use.303
On the other hand, the Teletech approach, which entirely rejects initial
interest confusion, does not sufficiently protect the rights of trademark own-
ers.3 4 For example, the two companies in CCBN. com were in direct competi-
tion. °5 The court characterized them as competitors in a "very narrow, if not
a two-player, market."13' This is exactly the type of situation in which the
defendant could have gotten a foot in the door with potential customers at the
299. Id. at 1094-95.
300. See Brookfield Communications, 174 F3d at 1056 (explaining differences between
Brookfield's and West Coast's products).
301. See New York State Soc'y of Certified Pub. Accountants v. Eric Louis Assocs., 79
F. Supp. 2d 331,341 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (stating that "Plaintiff and Defendant are... not in direct
competition with each other").
302. See id. at 342 (noting that partners of Eric Louis Associates were members of
NYSSCPA).
303. See 2 McCARHY, supra note 45, § 1 1.45 (stating that "[t]he policies of frce competi-
tion and free use of language dictate that trademark law cannot forbid the commercial use of
terms in their descriptive sense"). The fair use defense was probably not strenuously argued in
Eric Louis Associates because of the unusual procedural posture of the case. See Eric Louis
Assocs., 79 F. Supp. 2d at 333-34 (pointing out that sole issue before court was whether to
award attorney fees to plaintiff).
304. See supra notes 201-12 and accompanying text (discussing Teletech approach to
initial interest confusion in context ofdomain names).
305. See CCBN.com, Inc. v. c-call.com, Inc, 73 F. Supp. 2d 106, 114 (D. Mass. 1999)
(characterizing CCBN.com and c-call.com as direct competitors).
306. Id.
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expense of the plaintiff." The court therefore should have applied the initial
interest confusion doctrine to prevent competitive damage.
Because the initial interest confusion doctrine does not advance the
"consumer expectations" goal of trademark law, it should be applied only
where it will advance the "proprietary interest" goal.sr Overly broad applica-
tion of the doctrine will adversely affect the growth and maturation of search
engines and the Internet in general.
C. Initial Interest Confusion Could Impede Technological Innovation
While most users are more annoyed than confused by overly broad search
results, the state of existing search engine technology is such that search
engines themselves often will be confused by manipulative metatagging.3°
Search engines will no doubt continue to evolve and in the future will deliver
more accurate search results. However, overly broad trademark liability for
metatagging could have deleterious effects on search engine accuracy; search
engine queries will be even less precise if web authors are afraid to use terms
that may be relevant."' Additionally, the threat of litigation could mean that
search engine operators will choose to disregard metatags in their search
algorithms, resulting in less precise search results. 1 '
The potential for litigation also may deter potential web authors from
putting up their sites or including as much information as they otherwise
would. Most web page authors are very responsive to litigation or threatened
litigation and increasing trends toward overly broad trademark liability could
very well have a chilling effect. 312 For example, one commentator has sug-
gested regulating metatag use and strictly prohibiting the use of another's
307. See Bizuga, supra note 121, at 665 (arguing that actionable harm should exist when
company is trying to lure customers away from competitor).
308. See Nathenson, supra note 39, at 113 ("To blindly apply trademark infringement may
itself be anti-competitive, by overprotecting trademarks where no reasonable expectations
exist").
309. See id. (stating that "[a]ny confusion arising from meta tags is that of the search
engines themselves, because they lack the sophistication to cull the relevant from the irrele-
vant"); O'Rourke, supra note 30, at 294 ("Any confusion by manipulative metatagging is more
likely to be on the part of the search engine software than the user."); Sees, supra note 49, at
115 ("[T]he only confusion that might be said to result is that ofthe search engine in including
the web site in the query result").
310. See Nathenson, supra note 39, at 48-49 (explaining how threat of litigation could lead
to less effective search engines).
311. See Sees, supra note 49, at 118 (discussing how search engine operators may react
to increased threats of liability).
312. See Nathenson, supra note 39, at 70 (noting responsiveness of Internet community
to actual or threatened litigation).
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trademarks in a keyword or description metatag.3 13 This approach certainly
would prevent well-meaning webmasters from including relevant and descrip-
tive indexing information in their metatags and therefore would lead to less
accurate searches.
Given time, technology will develop more accurate ways of searching for
information on the Internet. There are already technologies on the way that
will lead to more accurate searches, such as the XML programming language
which could one day replace the currently used HTML language. 14 Internet
developers could also harness the system of "digital signatures" to ensure that
a link on a search engine results page is what it appears to be."15 Other com-
mentators have discussed the possibility of letting search engines regulate
metatag use themselves.316 While technological advances may make manipu-
lative metatagging obsolete, unscrupulous web page authors likely will find
new ways of deceiving and manipulating search engines. 3" However, tech-
nology should do a better job dealing with these problems than a legal system
that often has a difficult time even understanding the concepts involved. 318
D. Initial Interest Confusion Could Chill First Amendment Rights
on the Internet
The recent judicial and legislative trends toward expansion of trademark
rights mean that "our ability to discuss, portray, comment, criticize, and make
fun of companies and their products is diminishing." 1 9  This problem is
especially troubling in the Internet context because the Internet allows an
313. See Shipman, supra note 38, at 283-85 (proposing new trademark laws regulating
usage of metatags); see also Grable, supra note 264, at 262 (advocating blanket restrictions on
use of another party's trademark in metatags).
314. See Danny Sullivan, The New Meta TagsAre Coming- OrAre They?, athttp'/lwww.
serhenginewatrh.com/serpor97/12-metatgs.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2000) (describing
how XML programming language will use "RDF tags" which allow for more accurate indexing
than metatags currently used in HTML programming language).
315. See Oram, supra note 234, at 874 (discussing possibility of "digital signatures" being
used to authenticate search engine results).
316. See Sees, supra note 49, at 119 n.32 (raising possibility that search engines could
check for valid uses of trademarks in metatags); see also King, supra note 285, at 326-327
(arguing that search engines should consider changing their search algorithms or excluding
pages using manipulative metatags from their search indexes).
317. SeeNathenson, supra note 39, at 65-66 (discussing how new methods ofmanipulating
search engines to receive higher rankings are constantly emerging).
318. See Oram, supra note 234, at 874 (stating that "jt]echnological solutions often do a
better job of solving intellectual property problems than legal institutions could ever hope to
do").
319. Lemley, supra note 68, at 1711.
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individual to reach a greater number of consumers at a much lower cost than
traditional forms of media. As the Supreme Court recently stated, "through the
use of online chat rooms, any person with a phone line can become a town crier
with a voice that resonates farther than it could from any soapbox. Through the
use of Web pages, mail exploders, and newsgroups, the same individual can
become a pamphleteer."32 For this reason, the Court has indicated that speech
on the Internet is to be accorded the highest level of First Amendment protec-
tion. 21 The increasing reliance on the initial interest confusion doctrine in
Internet trademark disputes threatens to chill free speech rights on the Internet
and thus raises significant First Amendment implications.3'
Fair use defenses and trademark rights often have conflicted with each
other.3  There remains a split among courts as to whether fair use is an
absolute defense to trademark infringement regardless of the likelihood of
confusion, or whether fair use only "sets legal boundaries within which
someone may employ another's mark as long as his use of the mark does not
create a likelihood of confusion." 24 As one court espousing this latter view
has stated, "[b]ecause the primary purpose of the trademark laws is to protect
the public from confusion... it would be somewhat anomalous to hold that
the confusing use of another's trademark is 'fair use.""'3 Under this ap-
proach, an overly broad application of initial interest confusion has adverse
implications for web sites making fair use of trademarks because of the
inherent theoretical conflict between fair use defenses and initial interest
confusion as it has been applied to the Internet. After all, if the confusion at
issue is the momentary confusion an Internet user feels when he is diverted to
a web site which is not the one he was looking for, 26 why should a fair use
defense be available to make that confusion non-actionable?" z The initial
320. Reno v.ACLU, 521 U.S. 844,870 (1997).
321. Id.
322. See Oram, supra note 184, at 475 (arguing that broad application of intellectual
property law to Internet "thratens to eviscerate" First Amendment protections).
323. See 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 45, § 31:144 (describing conflict between fair use
defense and trademark rights).
324. See Michael 0. Frey, Comment, Is it Fair to Confuse? An Examination of Trademark
Protection, the Fair Use Defense, and the FirstAmendment, 65 U. CIN. L. REV. 1255, 1270
(1997) (examining split among courts as to whether fair use defense is part of likelihood of
confusion analysis or independent defense).
325. Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, 604 F.2d 200, 206 n.9 (2d
Cir. 1979).
326. See SNA v. Array, 51 F. Supp. 2d 542, 553 (ED. Pa. 1999) (stating that "[i]n any
case, the initial confusion of drawing the viewer to the site is the relevant confusion").
327. See Nathenson, supra note 39, at 114-15 (asking "if infringement is possible on a bare
meta tag, then why would one inquire whether there were 'use[s] in a permissible manner...
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confusion experienced by web users supposedly is damaging regardless of
whether the confusion immediately is dispelled by a disclaimer,32 so it would
seem that the confusion would be just as damaging ifthe web page is making
fair use of the trademark.
Several types of web sites may be vulnerable to claims of initial interest
confusion regardless of fair use defenses, including consumer commentary
sites, parody sites, and commercial sites containing comparative advertising.
Consumer commentary sites are web sites devoted to commentary and criti-
cism of specific companies which offer disgruntled employees and customers
an opportunity to post messages criticizing the company.329 These sites are
powerful vehicles for dissatisfied consumers to let both the company and the
general public know how they feel at a minimum of time and cost.330 At the
present time, there are hundreds of consumer commentary sites whose domain
names contain trademarks 331 or which use the names of company trademarks
in their metatags. 332 Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp. v. Faber was the first
in the visible portion of the web page [that] might even render non-infringing the additional use
of the mark' in a meta tag?" (quoting Marcelo Halpern, Meta-Tags: Effective Marketing or
Unfair Competition?, CYBERSPACE LAW., Oct 1997, at 2)).
328. See Paccar, Inc. v. Telescan Techs., LLC, 115 F. Supp. 2d 772, 778 (E.D. Mich.
2000) (finding disclaimer would not defeat initial interest confusion upon encountering web
site); Ford Motor Co. v. Ford Fin. Solutions, Inc., 103 F. Supp. 2d 1126, 1128 (N.D. Iowa
2000) (same); New York Soc'y of Certified Pub. Accountants v. Eric Louis Assocs., 79 F.
Supp. 2d 331,342 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (same); Jews for Jesus v. Brodsky, 993 F. Supp. 282,303
(D.N.J. 1998) (same), afid, 159 F3d 1351 (3d Cir. 1998); Planned Parenthood Fed'n ofAm.
v. Bucc, No. 97 CIV 0629,1997 WL 133313, at*12 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 1997) (same), af'd,
152 F.3d 920 (2d Cir. 1998).
329. See Robert Dodge, Online Opinions: Web Pages Can Sting Corporations, DALLAS
MoRNInNEwS, June 24,1999, at ID (describing consumer commentary sites).
330. See David Segal & Caroline E. Mayer, Sitesfor Sore Consumers: Complaints about
Companies Multiply on the Web, WASH. PoST, Mar. 28, 1999, at Al (discussing purposes of
consumer commentary sites).
331. See, e.g., Chase Manhattan Bank Sucks, at http'/www.chasebanksucks.com (last
visited January 26, 2001) (offering dissatisfied consumers opportunity to voice opinions on
Chase Manhattan Bank); I Hate Starbucks, at httpY/www.ihatestarbucks.com (last visited
January 26, 2001) (containing derogatory comments regarding Starbucks coffee chain); Wal-
MartSucks, athttp://www.walmartsucks.com (last visited January 26,2001) (offering commen-
tary and criticism of Wal-Mart stores).
332. See, e.g.,Break Up Microsoft-A True Grass RootsMovement, at http'//www.break
upmicrosofLorg (last visited January 26, 2001) (criticizing Microsoft and including "Microsof,"
"Windows," and "Internet Explorer" in metatags); Is Anheuser-Busch the Official Beer of
Homosexuals?, at http'//www.gaybeer.com (last visited January 26, 2001) (criticizing An-
heuser-Busch for marketing to homosexual community and including "Anheuser-Busch,"
"Budweiser," "Bud Light," and "Michelob" in metatags); Prodigy Internet Sucks, at http'I/
www.prodigy-sucks.com (last visited January 26,2001) (offering criticism of Prodigy Internet
services and containing registered marks "Prodigy" and "Prodigy Intemet" in metatags).
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reported decision to deal with consumer commentary sites, and the Bally court
allowed the web page as a fair use without addressing the issue of initial
interest confusion.333 Another recent case, Lucent Technologies, Inc. v.
Lucentsucks.com,"3 also found significant First Amendment interests in a
commentary site and suggested that such sites were not likely to constitute
trademark in gement.33s However, courts conceivably could apply initial
interest confusion in cases involving these types of web pages in the future
because the owners of these sites arguably are attempting to divert potential
customers from a company's official site.3 6
A federal court already invoked the doctrine of initial interest confusion
to shut down a parody site. In June of 2000, a federal court in Virginia ruled
in People for the Ethical Treatment ofAnimals, Inc. v. Doughney37 that the
defendant's "People Eating Tasty Animals" site at the domain "peta.org"
created a likelihood of confusion- 33 In PETA, the court did not explicitly
333. See supra notes 281-84 and accompanying text (discussing Bally case).
334. 95 F. Supp. 2d 528 (ED. Va. 2000).
335. See Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Lucentsucks.com, 95 F. Supp. 2d 528,535 (ED. Va. 2000)
(suggesting that customers would be unlikely to confuse "lucentsucks.com" commentary site
with official site of plaintiff). In Lucent, the plaintiff brought an in rem action against the
defendant web site under the recently enacted Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act
(ACPA). Id. at 528. The court found that the plaintiff had not complied with the jurisdictional
requirements of the ACPA, which stated that in rem actions may be filed only when the plaintiff
is unable to find or obtain in personam jurisdiction over the domain name registrant Id. at 531.
In this case, the plaintiff had not acted with the requisite "due diligence" to find the domain
name registrant Id. at 532-34. The court therefore dismissed the plaintiff's action. Id. at 536.
Before doing so, however, the court briefly analyzed the merits of the plainiff's claim. Id. at
535-36. The court noted the merit of defendant's argument that the web site constituted an
expression of free speech which the average consumer would not confuse with a web site
sponsored by Lucent Technologies. Id. at 535. According to the court, "[a] successful showing
that lucentsucks.com is... a cite [sic] for critical commentary would seriously undermine the
requisite elements for the causes of action at issue in this case." Id. at 535-36 (citing Bally Total
Fitness Holding Corp v. Faber, 29 F. Supp. 2d 1161,1164 (C.D. Cal. 1998)).
336. See Segal & Mayer, supra note 330, atAl (discussing purposes of consumer opinion
web sites).
337. 113 F. Supp. 2d 915 (E.D. Va. 2000).
338. See People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Doughney, 113 F. Supp. 2d
915, 921-22 (ED. Va. 2000) (finding that defendant's "People Eating TastyAnimals" web page
at "peta.org" domain was likely to cause confusion and ordering defendant to relinquish domain
name). In PETA, the plaintiffwas a non-profit organization, commonly known as PETA, which
advocated animal rights. Id. at 917. The defendant, Michael Doughney, registered the domain
name "peta.org" in September 1995 and created aweb site called "People Eating TastyAnimals"
at this address. Id. at 918. The web site advocated eating meat, hunting, and wearing fur and
leather clothing. Id. After unsuccessfully asking Doughney to voluntarily relinquish the
"peta.org" domain, the plaintiff commenced a lawsuit claiming trademark infringement, unfair
competition, and eybersquatting. Id. On the plaintiff's motion for summary judgement, the
court analyzed the trademark infringement claim, concluding that because the defendant's
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refer to initial interest confusion, but cited Planned Parenthood and Eric
Louis Associates for the questionable proposition that the defendant's use of
the "PETA" mark created "a presumption of likelihood of confusion among
internet users as a matter of law."339  The court rejected the defendant's
parody defense, claiming that the page was not an effective parody because
the user would not realize that the "peta.org" web site was a parody until
arriving at the web site.? ° According to this court; parody only exists when
two "antithetical ideas" appear at the same time.341 In this case, a user would
not realize that the web page was not affiliated with PETA until arriving at the
web. site and viewing the contents of the page.342 Therefore, "the 'People
Eating Tasty Animals' web site was not a parody because not simultaneous
[sic]."343 Under this restrictive view of parody, no web site whose domain
name contained a trademark could ever constitute an effective parody, unless
the user knew that the web page was a parody before typing the domain name
into his or her browser. Most parody sites, and even many consumer com-
mentary sites, would be vulnerable to infringement claims under this type of
analysis.
The decision in Brookfield Communications technically left the door
open for the fair use of another's trademark in metatags.3 " However, subse-
quent decisions have not always taken the fair use exception seriously; one
court went so far as to state that "in the case of metatags ... where the person
viewing the site may not even see the metatags, it is difficult to see how the
use could be fair."" Statements like this indicate the danger that the initial
domain name contained the plaintiff's trademark, likelihood of confusion should be presumed.
Id. at 919-920 (citing New York State Soc'y of Certified Pub. Accountants v. Eric Louis
Assoes., 79 F. Supp. 2d 331, 340 (S-DN.Y. 1999)). Later in the opinion, the court considered
the defendant's defense that his web site was a parody deserving of First Amendment protection.
Id. at 921. According to the court, the site could not be a parody because "a parody exists only
when two antithetical ideas appear at the same time." Id. The defendant's page could not be
considered a parody because the user would only realize that the site was not affiliated with
PETA after arriving at the web site. Id. Therefore, according to the court, the "antithetical
ideas" of the PETA name and the "People Eating Tasty Animals" web page were not simulta-
neous, and the page was not a parody. Id.





344. See Brokflild Communications, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036,1065
(9th Cir. 1999) ("[W]e are not in any way restricting West Coast's right to use terms in a
manner which would constitute fair use under the Lanham Act").
345. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 2d 834, 846 (S.D. Ind. 2000),
aji'd, 233 F.3d 456 (7th Cir. 2000).
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interest confusion doctrine poses to First Amendment freedoms. Courts
considering fair use defenses generally weigh the likelihood of confusion
against the First Amendment rights involved. 46 The initial interest confusion
doctrine assumes a very high likelihood of confusion, which could tip the
scales against free expression in many fair use cases. 47
. Finding a Proper Place for Initial Interest Confusion in
Internet Trademark Law
The initial interest confusion doctrine should be invoked only where it
will prevent competitive damage. Courts should not find a likelihood of
confusion based solely on the possibility of initial interest confusion. " s Two
additional factors should be present in order for a court to base a finding of
trademark infringement on initial interest confusion: competitive proximity
and bad faith intent on the part of the alleged infringer. Courts should apply
a high standard for determining relatedness in initial interest confusion claims.
The fact that two parties may both market through the Internet does not make
their goods or services related." 9 Courts should reject arguments that the
"conceptual nature" ofthe goods and services are related because both compa-
nies have web sites. 50 Additionally, complementary goods or services are not
sufficient; the goods or services should be in direct competition with each
other." Where the only confusion is initial interest confusion, the goods or
services of the parties should be similar enough so that there is a possibility
that a sizeable number of consumers reasonably could decide to use one
party's goods or services as a substitute for those provided by the other party.
Furthermore, courts should carefully evaluate the intent of the alleged
infringer. Trademark infringement law traditionally has not required bad faith
346. See Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 998-1000 (2d Cir. 1989) (suggesting that
courts should show greater sensitivity to First Amendment values in cases in which there is onlyminimal likelihood of confusion).
347. See Oram, supra note 184, at 501 (arguing that courts tip scales against First Amend-
ment interests when they broadly interpret likelihood of confusion).
348. See Playboy Enters. v. Welles, 78 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1094 (S.D. CaL 1999) (stating
that presence of initial interest confusion does not necessarily support finding of likelihood of
confusion); see also Nathenson, supra note 39, at 118 (arguing that initial interest confusion
should require "plus factor" to mature into trademark infringement).
349. See Bally Total Fitness Holding Co. v. Faber, 29 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1163 (CD. Cal.
1998) (stating that Internet is communications medium, not good or service).
350. See Walker v. Mattel, Inc., 31 F. Supp. 2d 751, 760 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (rejecting
conceptual nature" standard because it "has no logical stopping point [and] distorts the test for
relatedness beyond all reasonable bounds").
351. See O'Rourke, supra note 30, at 296 (arguing that in metatagging cases in which
parties offer services that are merely complementary in nature, confusion is unlikely to exist).
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on the part of the alleged infringer because consumer confusion can occur
even if the use is in good faith. 2 However, the Brookfield Communications
court implied that West Coast's bad faith intentto divert Brookfield's custom-
ers was a part of the rationale for the court's holding." 3 Where the intent is
merely to fairly describe the contents of a web site (such as in Welles), or to
criticize or make fun of a trademark or trademark owner (such as in Bally),
courts should be wary of granting relief based solely on initial interest confu-
sion.
354
Additionally, courts should apply more conceptually appropriate reme-
dies whenever possible. For example, several commentators have suggested
that trademark dilution would be a more conceptually appropriate remedy in
metatagging cases.355 The damage in manipulative metatagging occurs not
when search engine users are "misdirected," but when a valid site of a trade-
mark is difficult to find because of the surrounding "noise."36 Most users
read only the first several results on a list that can number in the hundreds or
thousands; the loss of-visits to an official site surrounded by "noise" is the real
damage.
357
Trademark dilution is fundamentally different from trademark infringe-
ment because relatedness of goods or services and likelihood of confusion are
not required elements of a trademark dilution claim."' The federal cause of
action for trademark dilution is codified in Section 43(c) of the Lanham Act,
352. See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 45, § 23:106 (discussing general lack of bad faith
requirement in trademark law).
353. See Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. W. CoastEntm't Corp., 174 F3d 1036,1062
(9th Cir. 1999) (suggesting that use of another's trademark in manner "calculated" to capture
initial attention can be grounds for trademark inflingement).
354. See White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., 989 F.2d 1512, 1514 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski,
J., dissenting) (denying en bane rehearing) (noting that "[ilntellectual property rights aren't like
some constitutional fights, absolute guarantees protected against all kinds of interference").
355. See, e.g., Nathenson, supra note 39, at 118 (claiming dilution cause of action is
"tailor-made" for manipulative metatagging claims); O'Rourke, supra note 30, at 302 (arguing
that dilution by blurring is claim which offers greatest possibility of success in metatagging
cases); Mark Everett Chancey, Comment, Meta-Tags and Hypertext Deep Linking: How the
Essential Components of Webauthoring and Internet Guidance are StrengtheningIntellectual
Property Rights on the World Wide Web, 29 STETSON L. REV. 203,227 n. 183 (1999) (stating
that dilution would have been more conceptually appropriate cause of action in Brookfield
Communications).
356. See O'Rourke, supra note 30, at 301 (stating metatagging creates noise around
trademark which makes it difficult for users to find mark owner's site).
357. See Shipman, supra note 38, at 276 (stating that loss of visits is where damage
occurs).
358. See O'Rourke, supra note 30, at 299 (noting differences between trademark infringe-
ment and trademark dilution).
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which defines dilution as "the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to
identify and distinguish goods or services, regardless of the presence or
absence of (1) competition between the owner of the famous mark and other
parties, or (2) likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception."3 9 Manipulative
metatagging, through the creation of "noise" that surrounds the site of a
trademark's owner, lessens the capacity of the mark to identify goods and
services.3"c Therefore, dilution appears to be a more conceptually sound cause
of action than infringement based on initial interest confusion. However,
dilution protection is limited to "famous" marks, so courts still have to con-
sider metatagging claims dealing with non-famous marks under the infringe-
ment framework.
36'
Moreover, the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act362 (ACPA),
a potentially powerful new weapon for trademark owners that President
Clinton signed into law in November 1999, provides a more appropriate
remedy in certain domain name disputes. 63 The title of the law is something
of a misnomer in that it proscribes a much broader range of conduct than the
traditional definition of cybersquatting (registering another's trademark as a
domain name with the intent to sell the domain to the mark's owner). The
ACPA prohibits any individual or business from registering a domain name
which is "identical or confusingly similar" to a distinctive trademark.36 The
first appellate ruling to apply the ACPA365 has noted that "confusingly simi-
lar" is a different standard from the "likelihood of confusion" test of trade-
mark law.31 Unlike trademark infringement, the law also requires 'bad faith
intent" on the part of the cybersquatter in order to be held liable. 6 This
statute provides a much better framework than initial interest confusion for
analyzing domain name cases. However, depending on how narrow a reading
courts give the "confusingly similar" and "bad faith" requirements, there may
still be a place for initial interest confusion in domain name disputes.
359. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1999).
360. See Nathenson, supra note 39, at 119 (arguing dilution by blurring best describes
harm caused by manipulative metatagging).
361. See id. at 118-19 (noting that dilution protection is limited to famous marks).
362. Pub. L. No. 106-113 (1999).
363. Id.
364. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(dX1XAXiiX'I) (Supp. 1999).
365. See Sporty's Farm v. Sportsman's Mkt., 202 F3d 489, 498 (2d Cir. 2000) (finding
that Sporty's Farm had violated ACPA when it registered "sportys.com" domain which was
confusingly similar to Sportsman's "sporty's" trademark), cert denied, 120 S. Ct 2719 (2000).
366. See id. at 499 n.13 (recognizing difference between likelihood of confusion in
trademark law and "confusingly similar" requirement ofACPA).
367. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(dX1XAXi) (Supp. 1999).
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VI. Conclusion
The growing reliance on initial interest confusion parallels other trends
in which new trademark doctrines are introduced that are appropriate in
limited situations, but then are stretched beyond the bounds of common
sense.s There is a place for the initial interest confusion doctrine in Internet
trademark jurisprudence, but courts must keep the basic goals of trademark
law in mind.369 Courts must remember that just because there may be some
initial or momentary confusion on the part of Internet users, this does not
automatically constitute a likelihood of confusion. 7 This is a subtlety that
has been lost on some courts. 7' The effects and scope of the initial interest
confusion at hand must be closely analyzed to determine if there is a reason-
able likelihood of confusion among potential consumers.
Courts should consider initial interest confusion within the context ofthe
traditional likelihood of confusion factors, particularly the sophistication of
consumers, the competitive proximity ofthe goods or services at issue, and the
presence or absence of bad faith on the part of the alleged infringer As one
court analyzing an Internet trademark dispute aptly noted, "some people are
always confused." '372 It is therefore important for courts to keep in mind the
traditional requirement of the "reasonably prudent" consumer and to attribute
a reasonable level of sophistication to Internet users. 73 As previously dis-
368. See Lemley, supra note 68, at 1698 (citing recent trends in trademark dilution and
trade dress product configuration as examples of this "doctrinal creep").
369. See Playboy Enters. v. Welles, 78 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1095 (S.D. Cal. 1999) ("In
rendering an analysis which is flexible and reflective of 'emerging technologies,' this court is
also mindful that it must not lose sight of either common sense or the important, foundational
and underlying principles of trademark law.").
370. See The Network Network v. CBS, Inc., No. CV 98-1349 NM, 2000 WL 362016, at
*5 (CD. Cal. Jan. 19,2000) ("There is a difference between inadvertently landing on a website
and being confused.").
371. See New York State Soc'y of Certified Pub. Accountants v. Eric Louis Assocs., 79
F. Supp. 2d 331,342 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (stating that defendant's use of plaintiff's NYSSCPA"
mark in domain name and metatags "caused a likelihood of confusion because it created initial
interest confusion").
372. Playboy Enters. v. Netscape Communications, 55 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1083 (CD. Cal.
1999); see also Reed-Union v. Turtle Wax, Inc. 77 F.3d 909, 912 (7th Cir. 1996) ('Befuddle-
ment is part of the human condition.").
373. See, e.g., Int'l Ass'n ofMachinists and Aerospace Workers v. Winship Green Nursing
Ctr., 103 F.3d 196, 204 (1st Cir. 1996) (stating that courts should assume potential customers
are of ordinary intelligence); Indianapolis Colts, Inc. v. Metro. Baltimore Football Club Ltd.,
34 F.3d 410, 414 (7th Cir. 1994) (noting that trademark laws are not intended to "protect the
most gullible fringe of the consuming public"); United States v. 88 Cases, More or Less,
Containing Bireley's Orange Beverage, 187 F.2d 967, 971 (3d Cir. 1951) (inferring that in
enacting Lanham Act, Congress "contemplated the reaction of the ordinary person who is
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cussed, some courts have attributed an unreasonably low level of sophistica-
tion to Internet users.
37 4
The Internet will continue to expand at an exponential rate in the coming
years. 375 Courts must strike a careful balance between the need to protect
trademarks and the need to encourage the growth and maturation of this new
medium. 376 Overprotection of intellectual property rights inevitably will stifle
this vibrant marketplace ofideas. When considering a trademark infingement
claim where the only likely confusion is initial interest confusion, courts
should find trademark infringemient only where the companies' goods or
services are closely related and there is a realistic threat of competitive
damage.
377
neither savant nor dolt, [and] who... exercises a normal measure of the layman's common
sense and judgment").
374. See supra notes 238-43 and accompanying text (discussing continuing judicial view
that internet users lack sophistication).
375. See Leslie Walker, Addressing the Name Question, WASH. PosT, Dec. 23, 1999, at
E01 (pointing out that there are nine million domain names currently registered and that analysts
predict there will be soon be over 100 million registered).
376. See Playboy Enters. v. Welles, 78 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1095 (S.D. Cal. 1999) (noting
that courts must "be careful to give consumers the freedom to locate desired sites while
protecting the integrity of trademarks and trade names").
377. See The NetworkNetwork v. CBS, Inc., No. CV 98-1349 NM, 2000 WL 362016, at
*8-9 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2000) (declaring that similarity of goods and services is required for
initial interest confusion to be actionable).
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